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a b s t r a c t 
Despite being paid less than men and facing worse working conditions, lower promotion opportunities and work- 
place discrimination, women typically report higher levels of job satisfaction. Twenty years ago Andrew Clark 
(Clark, 1997) suggested that this might be due to their lower expectations, driven by a number of factors related 
to current and past positions in the labour market. Although this hypothesis is one of the leading explanations of 
gender diﬀerences in job satisfaction, cross-country research on the relationship between gender inequality and 
the gender-job satisfaction gap is rare and only descriptive. In this paper, we use the data from EU-SILC module 
on subjective well-being from 2013 to analyse adjusted gender-job satisfaction gaps in 32 European countries and 
we relate them to country diﬀerences in gender inequalities. Our results provide extensive and robust evidence of 
a relationship between exposure to more gender equal settings in the early stages of life and smaller gender gaps 
in job satisfaction. This corroborates the hypothesis that women who grew up in contexts with higher gender 
equality have expectations increasingly aligned to those of their male counterparts. Our results also show that 
being employed in typically male occupations enables this alignment too, whereas higher levels of education do 
not play a similar eﬀect. 
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0. Introduction 
In parallel with extensive evidence of women having lower wages,
oorer job conditions, and being worse oﬀ in terms of discrimination,
ob content and promotion opportunities, female workers are frequently
ound to have equal or higher levels of job satisfaction than men (e.g.
lark, 1997; Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza, 2003; Kaiser, 2007, Blanch-
ower et al., 1993 ). After numerous conﬁrmations of this result, this
mpirical ﬁnding is now referred to as the gender-job satisfaction para-
ox . 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to this body of literature,
long the avenue traced by Clark (1997) , by providing econometric
vidence that the existence and the extent of the paradox can be ex-
lained by exposure to gender unequal socio-economic settings. To this
nd, we use micro data from the special module on well-being of the
013 EU-SILC in combination with various gender inequality country-
evel indicators. The paper adds to the existing knowledge on the topic
y: (i) providing extensive and recent cross-country evidence on the
xistence and size of the gender-job satisfaction paradox in Europe
32 countries, year 2013); (ii) estimating the paradox and its relation-
hip with gender inequality indicators by means of econometric meth-
ds able to account for potential misspeciﬁcation and comparability
ssues. 
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927-5371/© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Our results show that, once all observables are controlled for, higher
xposure to gender-unequal settings in early stages of life corresponds
o women’s higher levels of reported job satisfaction. Such evidence
s consistent with the idea that women’s lower expectations of their
ob positions, shaped by growing up in gender unequal settings, might
e at the root of the paradox. This interpretation is in line with the
ody of evidence showing that culture and institutions shape social
orms, preferences and beliefs ( Guiso et al., 2006; Tabellini, 2010; Lipp-
ann et al., 2016 ) that, especially if formed during crucial develop-
ental age, persistently aﬀect individual behaviour ( Alesina and Fuchs-
chundeln, 2007 ). We also show that, independently from the eﬀect of
nequal settings in early stages of life, employment in typically male oc-
upations reverses the paradox (i.e., in male occupations women have
ower job satisfaction), supposedly (in our interpretative framework) by
nabling women to revise their beliefs and align expectations to those
f men. Attaining higher levels of education, by contrast, does not play
ny direct role in the paradox. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next sec-
ion we review and discuss the main existing studies on job satisfaction
nd the gender paradox. We elaborate in particular on the contributions
hat explain how women’s expectations and preferences are shaped by
ender inequality observed in the labour market and by beliefs in gen-
er roles. In Section 3 we describe the data, the empirical methods andien.bg.ac.rs (M. Vladisavljevi ć). 
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t  he estimated levels of the job satisfaction gender gap across Europe. In
ections 4 and 5 we augment the empirical model in order to account for
he eﬀect of exposure to (current and past) gender equality/inequality
ettings on the job satisfaction paradox. Section 6 summarizes and con-
ludes. 
. The gender-job satisfaction paradox and gender inequality 
Job satisfaction can be deﬁned as “a pleasant or positive emotional
tate that is a result of the assessment of one’s job or job experiences ”
 Locke, 1970 ). One of the most prominent researchers on job satisfac-
ion, Andrew Clark (1996, 1997) , highlights two strong reasons for the
eed to investigate job satisfaction: 1) it represents a measure of indi-
idual well-being, the distribution of which is one of the most central
opics in economics, and 2) it is one of the best predictors of job per-
ormance (quits, absenteeism, and productivity) as well as of customer
atisfaction ( Rogers et al., 1994 ). Therefore, although being a subjec-
ive concept, and as such exposed to fundamental criticism ( Kahneman,
999; Alexandrova, 2005; Sen, 1979 ), job satisfaction has been proven
o be signiﬁcant and complementary to objective welfare indicators (e.g.
tiglitz et al., 2009 ). 
From the perspective of psychology and management, Hulin and
udge (2003) view job satisfaction as a multi-dimensional concept that
ncludes a cognitive and an aﬀective component. While the cognitive
omponent requires evaluation of actual working conditions and their
omparison to workers’ expectations, the aﬀective component refers
o the level of happiness and positive emotions related to the job.
conomists, on the other hand, use the concept of job satisfaction as
ne operationalization of total utility from work ( Clark, 1996 ). In this
ine of research, job satisfaction is measured via one item which is, from
he perspective of a multi-dimensional structure, typically cognitive. 1 
ithin this framework, job satisfaction is seen as a utility function, de-
ermined by wages ( y ), working hours ( h ) and a set of job ( j ) and indi-
idual ( i ) characteristics ( Clark and Oswald, 1996 ): 
𝑆 = 𝑈 = 𝑈 ( 𝑦, ℎ, 𝑗, 𝑖 ) (1)
herein preferences for higher income and fewer working hours are as-
umed. Wages inﬂuence job satisfaction in accordance with the rule of
iminishing marginal utility of income, which justiﬁes the use of the
atural logarithm of earnings instead of levels in specifying the util-
ty function ( Clark and Oswald, 1996 ). The relation between working
ours and job satisfaction, once individual and household characteris-
ics (including income) are accounted for, is also non-linear: satisfaction
rows with the hours worked, but begins to decline when the number of
ours becomes excessive and burdensome ( Dolan et al., 2008; Meier and
tutzer, 2008 ). Among other job characteristics, smaller ﬁrms, perma-
ent contracts and work in the public sector are frequently associated
ith higher levels of job satisfaction due to combined eﬀects of higher
ob security and higher intrinsic motivation for work ( Buelens and Van
en Broeck, 2007; Ghinetti, 2007; Vladisavljevi ć, 2017 ). Evidence on
he eﬀects of occupations is not conclusive and depends on the vari-
bles included in the estimation (e.g., Clark, 1996 ). Among individual
haracteristics, marital status is typically associated with higher levels
f job satisfaction, though evidence is still inconclusive ( Gazioglu and
ansel, 2006 ), while the correlation of job satisfaction and age is typ-
cally U-shaped ( Clark et al., 1996 ). When controlled for other work-
ng conditions (salary, occupation, etc.), educational eﬀects are fre-
uently found to be negative. This has been attributed, by some authors
 Clark and Oswald, 1996 ), to higher work expectations of more educated
eople. 1 Usually the reason for using only one item is the fact that researchers are 
nterested in nationally representative data sets which, due to their size, opt for 
 limited number of questions. Similarly, in EU-SILC, satisfaction with work is 
easured over a single, global cognitive item. See more details in Section 3.1 . 
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130 In addition, existing literature shows that another major factor in
ob satisfaction is gender, which will be our focus here. In his refer-
nce paper, Clark (1997) ﬁnds that women in the UK have higher job
atisfaction than men and discusses the potential reasons behind the dif-
erences. He classiﬁes them into ﬁve groups: 1) diﬀerences in individual
nd job characteristics; 2) diﬀerences in work values; 3) selection bias;
) diﬀerences in relative income distributions; and 5) diﬀerences in ex-
ectations. According to his ﬁndings, factors 1) to 4), although relevant,
annot fully explain the gender-job satisfaction gap. On the other hand,
e ﬁnds that gender diﬀerences in job satisfaction are not signiﬁcant
or younger and highly educated workers, workers whose mothers had
rofessional jobs, workers in professional or managerial positions and in
ale-dominated workplaces. His interpretation is that women in these
roups have higher expectations from work than other women, because
hey had diﬀerent role models in early childhood or were exposed to
ood jobs during their work-life. This suggests that the higher female
ob satisfaction generally observed might be due to lower job expecta-
ions 2 resulting “from the poorer position in the labour market that women
ave held in the past ” ( Clark, 1997 , p.342). As a consequence, the gender-
ob satisfaction paradox is expected to be a transitory phenomenon. As
oon as more women are exposed to better jobs, or to contexts enabling
hem to overcome gender roles beliefs, they will revise their expecta-
ions upwards and the gap in job satisfaction will disappear. 
The evidence of a declining job satisfaction paradox over time pro-
ided by Green et al. (2018) and Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza (2003) con-
rms that this might have been the case in the UK over the periods
991–2012 and 1991–2000, respectively. Senik (2017) also provides
orroborative results: as aspirations and promotion opportunities for
en and women become more equal over time, the gender-job satisfac-
ion gap decreases, which is why it is lower for more recent generations.
s a possible explanation of the generalised decline in women’s happi-
ess observed in the last decades, Stevenson and Wolfers (2009) pro-
ose the idea that their expectations rose faster than society was able to
eet them. As a result, actual experienced lives drove women’s subjec-
ive well-being (both absolutely and relative to men) downwards. Simi-
arly, Graham and Chattopadhyay (2013) identify expectations and so-
ial norms as the factors able to play a mediating role in shaping gender
ell-being diﬀerences. In particular, they argue that changes in norms
nd expectations that accompany changes in gender rights and roles
eem to be associated with a decline in women’s well-being, at least in
he short term, as it may take time for the new norms to become estab-
ished or accepted. In other words, declining levels of satisfaction might
e observed when equality de jure rises faster than equality de facto . 
Besides expectations, the link between gender equality and gender
ob satisfaction paradox could work through another mechanism – dif-
erences in job values. Previous research (e.g., Sloane and Williams,
000; Bender et al., 2005 ) suggested that women have higher job sat-
sfaction in female-dominated occupations because they attach higher
alue to aspects of work such as ﬂexibility, social connections, etc., even
hough these jobs involve lower wages and poorer working conditions.
he idea of diﬀerent job values for men and women has received ex-
ensive attention ( Marini et al., 1996; Neil and Snizek, 1987; Dæhlen,
007; Gooderham et al., 2004 ). As beliefs on gender roles are shaped,
mong other things, by observed and experienced gender inequalities
e.g., Hiller, 2014; Alesina et al., 2013; Giuliano, 2017; Giménez-Nadal
t al., 2019 ), women in less equal societies are “socialized ” to put a
igher value on aspects of work consistent with the role they are (sup-
osedly) assigned by society. This translates into higher job satisfaction
han men’s, when controlled for wages and other individual and job2 According to other authors ( Bender et al., 2005 ), the notion of expectations 
an also be understood in terms of the eﬀects of social norms on job satisfaction: 
s women are socialized not to anticipate high satisfaction from work, they can 
e surprised by their actual experiences and therefore have higher levels of job 
atisfaction. 
C. Perugini and M. Vladisavljevi ć Labour Economics 60 (2019) 129–147 
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m  haracteristics. As a consequence, the idea of a link between the gender-
ob satisfaction paradox and gender inequality is, from the values per-
pective, the same as from the expectations perspective: higher levels of
bserved gender inequality lead to higher levels of job satisfaction gap.
Empirical research on gender gaps in job satisfaction and its rela-
ions with gender inequality is not extensive and has mainly focused
n showing descriptively that progress in gender equality corresponds
o a weakening of the job satisfaction paradox. This is the case of the
ork, mentioned above, by Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza (2003) . Sim-
larly, Kaiser (2007) compares gender-job satisfaction gaps in 14 EU
tates and ﬁnds that the paradox does not appear in more gender equal
ountries such as Denmark, Finland and Netherlands, nor in Portugal,
here men enjoy better working positions and have higher job satisfac-
ion. In all other 10 countries, 3 where according to the author gender
quality is lower, he ﬁnds that job satisfaction is ceteris paribus higher
or women. Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza (2000) analyse gender-job sat-
sfaction gaps in 21 countries and ﬁnd that women have higher levels
f job satisfaction in Great Britain, United States, Hungary and New
ealand, while in the remaining countries the gap is not statistically
igniﬁcant. They point out that in the countries where gender-job sat-
sfaction gap exists women have higher “work-role outputs ”, such as
ob security, feeling that their work is useful and good relations with
anagement and colleagues. However, as the authors emphasize, these
actors cannot fully account for the cross-country diﬀerences in gender-
ob satisfaction gaps and they propose Clark’s hypothesis as one of the
otential explanations. 
Our attempt here is to contribute to this literature by providing direct
conometric evidence, on a cross-country basis, on the link between
evels of gender inequality and the existence and extent of the paradox.
. Gender diﬀerences in job satisfaction across Europe 
.1. Data and variables 
To estimate the job satisfaction gender gap we use the 2013 EU
urvey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), which includes in-
ormation on 32 European countries (28 EU members plus Norway,
witzerland, Iceland and Serbia). We selected the data for 2013 since
he survey for this year included an ad-hoc module on well-being, with
 question on job satisfaction. The topics of ad-hoc modules in EU-
ILC rotate on a ﬁve-year basis, so the next one on well-being will be
vailable only when data with 2018 as a reference year are released.
s a consequence, our analysis here is based on a cross-country sam-
le of individuals observed in one year only. Previous research has
argely conﬁrmed good psychometric properties of the EU-SILC mod-
le on well-being (e.g., Vladisavljevi ć and Mentus, 2018 ). Moreover,
U-SILC is especially suitable for this research as it contains country-
omparable, detailed information on income, hours worked, individual
nd job characteristics, all of which are necessary to perform the analy-
is. Our total sample includes 359,695 persons in working age (19–64).
f them, 124,822 enter the sample for the estimation of the gender-job
atisfaction gap, which includes workers in dependent employment and
xcludes the self-employed, agriculture workers, workers in training and
ersons not responding to the question on job satisfaction. 4 The share of
en and women who enter the estimation sample is approximately the
ame (35.4% for women and 34.0% for men), due to the higher share of3 Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Spain 
nd the UK. 
4 We dropped the self-employed due to inapplicability of the some of the ques- 
ions such as ﬁrm size and temporary work (similarly to Clark, 1997 ) and diﬀer- 
nces in job utility determinants such as income and other working conditions 
 Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 1992 ). Similarly, we excluded agriculture workers 
s their job satisfaction can be under the strong inﬂuence of weather and other 
nobservable working conditions, and persons in training as their job satisfac- 
ion might be confounded with training satisfaction. 
m  
g  
p
g
e
k
e
“
131 en among the self-employed and unemployed, which “compensates ”
or the lower labour market activity of women. 
Job satisfaction is measured via response on an eleven-point Likert
ype scale (from 0 - “not at all satisﬁed ” to 10 - “completely satisﬁed ”) to
he question “How do you evaluate your current job?" (variable PW010
n the dataset). According to Eurostat (2012) , when answering the ques-
ion, “the respondent should make a broad, reﬂective appraisal of all areas
f his/her job in a particular point in time (current situation) ”. Global cog-
itive operationalization of job satisfaction fully corresponds to the total
ork utility approach proposed by Clark (1996) . 
Besides gender, we use a large set of control variables to account for
ender diﬀerences in individual and job characteristics, which include:
og monthly wages, weekly working hours (and a dummy for working
ore than 50 hours), age (and its square), marital status, education,
ccupation, sector of employment, presence of an additional job, ﬁrm
ize and type of contract (permanent vs. temporary), as well the country
xed eﬀects (for more details and deﬁnitions of the variables used, see
able A1 in the Appendix). 
.2. Econometric methods and baseline empirical model 
The nature of the dataset and the aims of the analysis pose impor-
ant speciﬁcation issues related to: (i) comparability of job/individual
haracteristics; (ii) sample selection; and (iii) the multilevel structure
f data. In order to address the ﬁrst aspect, prior to model estimation,
e applied the nearest neighbour matching technique ( Abadie and Im-
ens, 2002 ) that restricts the sample to men and women whose individ-
al and job characteristics are comparable. Since gender occupational
nd sectoral segregation have long been established in the literature,
ailing to account for comparability of empirical distribution of individ-
al characteristics can cause severe misspeciﬁcation problems, which
ave been largely documented in the impact evaluation literature. The
ecent acknowledgment of such issues has led to the development of
everal methods which incorporate the matching framework in analy-
es of gender wage diﬀerences (e.g., Nopo, 2008 ). This method ensures
hat there are men and women in the sample who have comparable ob-
ervable characteristics, therefore providing a more robust method for
omparing their job satisfaction. 
We implement the nearest neighbour matching procedure by using
tata nnmatch command ( Abadie et al., 2004 ). Applied to the investi-
ation of gender diﬀerences in job satisfaction, the procedure can be
escribed in the following way. Within each country k , we consider a
ale 5 worker i ( i = 1, 2, … p), with x im – vector of m observed covari-
tes determining his job satisfaction. Allowing for the possibility of ties,
e deﬁne d mij = ‖x im – z jm ‖ as a multidimensional distance from the co-
ariates of a male worker i to covariates of all potential matches from
he pool of female workers, where z jm are the values of covariates for
emale worker j ( j = 1, 2, … q). Female worker w , with the values of
ovariates z wm is the “nearest neighbour ” of male worker i if condition
𝑗, { 𝑑 𝑖𝑤𝑚 = ‖𝑥 ℑ − − 𝑧 𝑤𝑚 ‖ ≤ 𝑑 𝑖𝑗𝑚 } is satisﬁed, i.e., if the multidimensional
istance from the covariates of male worker i to the covariates of female
orker w is lower or equal than the distance from the covariates of male
orker i to the covariates of all other female workers from that country.
In this paper, the nearest neighbour matching procedure is imple-
ented within each country k , demanding that men and women are
atched exactly ( 𝑑 𝑖𝑤𝑚 = 0 , ∀𝑚 ) on: wage quintile groups, working hours
roups, education, occupation, sector (two groups: industry vs. ser-5 We deﬁne the matching procedure from the perspective of men, but the 
rocedure and its outcomes would be the same if we take women as the reference 
roup, as we are requesting the exact match, and not using the procedure to 
stimate the “treatment ” eﬀect. Instead, we are using the procedure option that 
eeps the results of the matching in the database; this enables us to identify, for 
ach observation, and regardless of whether they are in the “treated ” (men) or 
control ” group (women), the counterpart with the same characteristics. 
C. Perugini and M. Vladisavljevi ć Labour Economics 60 (2019) 129–147 
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p  ices), temporary/permanent contract, and age group. 6 Since we do
ot want to estimate the gap as a treatment eﬀect, but rather only to
estrict our sample, we demand the procedure to choose only one near-
st neighbour, and allow observations to be used as nearest neighbours
ore than once, which makes the matching order irrelevant. Female
nd male respondents who do not have exact opposite sex matches are
hen dropped from the sample. After matching, 83,555 out of 124,822
ndividuals (67.0%) are kept in the analysis. 7 
The second issue is related to selection bias. The selection of women
nd men into the sample of dependent employment, for which we ob-
erve job satisfaction, might not be random. Since being in dependent
mployment could be systematically correlated with job satisfaction, es-
imated coeﬃcients from the job satisfaction equation could be biased
 Clark, 1997 ). This is particularly important when estimating gender
aps (and their interactions with other variables), as diﬀerent mecha-
isms could be behind female and male sample selection. For example,
omen dissatisﬁed with market jobs could opt for home work more fre-
uently than dissatisﬁed men ( Stevenson and Wolfers, 2009 ). If this is
he case, the observed distribution of job satisfaction between genders
ould be biased. Although the share of women and men in dependent
mployment in our data is approximately the same, these eﬀects need
o be accounted for. 
Typically, selection bias is addressed by using Heckman selection
orrection ( Heckman, 1979 ), and inclusion of the “omitted variable ” –
nverse Mills ratio (IMR). IMR is based on the probability to be in the
stimation sample (in our case dependent employment), estimated via
robit regression conditional on the set of selection variables. However,
s gender equality indicators that we use in the latter parts of the analy-
is potentially vary with current participation rates and not with shares
f dependent employment (which would be modelled in the Heckman-
wo stage model) we need to account for a more complex structure of
he selection. To this aim, we make use of Bourguignon et al. (2007) cor-
ection of the Dubin and McFadden (1984) model that allows us to si-
ultaneously control for several (multinomial) selection eﬀects. Within
his procedure we divide working age population (19–64) into four
roups, based on the self-declared labour market status and availability
f the estimation variables: (1) job satisfaction gap estimation group;
2) other employed (self-employed, workers in training or education,
griculture workers, missing values for job satisfaction, dropped from
he matching) 8 ; (3) unemployed; and 4) inactive. The procedure is sim-
lar to the Heckman correction as it also consists of two steps. In the
rst step, we estimate, via multinominal logit, the selection into one
f the four groups, 9 conditional on the set of personal and household6 Working hours groups: part-time, full-time and overtime (while part- vs. 
ull-time distinction is self-assessed, overtime workers are identiﬁed as full time 
orkers who work more than 50 hours per week); education groups (primary, 
econdary and tertiary education, see Table A1 for details); Occupation - ISCO 1 
roups (see Table A1 for details on the occupation groups); age groups: 19/24, 
5/34, 35/44, 45/54, 55/64. 
7 In other words, 33% of workers cannot be matched (about 37% of men and 
9% of women). In most of the cases men and women cannot be matched by 
ccupation (26% of men and 20% of women), followed by wage quintile (16% 
f men and 10% of women) and age group (7% of men and 6% of women), 
hile for other used characteristics matching does not occur in less than 1% of 
ases. Percentages by groups do not sum up total number of cases that cannot 
e matched, as the characteristics that cannot be matched are not exclusive, 
.e., it is possible that a person has more than one characteristic that cannot be 
atched. 
8 In our estimations we use the sample constructed after the matching; the 
ull sample is instead used for robustness checks. In this ﬁrst case, workers ex- 
luded via matching from the estimation sample are included in the group for 
he estimation of the selection eﬀects; in the second case this group is included 
n the estimation sample. 
9 Given the structure of the sample we use for the control of the selection 
ias (two groups of employed: employees and self-employed; and two groups 
f out of work: unemployed and inactive), a natural concern is whether the 
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132 haracteristics: age and age squared, education, marital status, status of
he household head, number of children in the household (three vari-
bles for children aged up to two years, two to six years and seven to
ourteen), number of elderly and household size. Identiﬁcation of the
election model relies on the distributional assumptions of the method
roposed in Bourguignon et al. (2007) 10 and is further strengthened
y estimating selection equations separately for each gender and coun-
ry. Based on the estimated probabilities of participation in each of the
our groups, we compute the inverse Mills ratios (IMRs) as the ratios of
he probability density function to the cumulative distribution function
 Wooldridge, 2002 ). Four IMRs, each derived from the probability to be
n one of the four statuses, are then added to the list of covariates in the
ob satisfaction equation presented below. 11 
Lastly, pooling data for diﬀerent countries creates a multilevel struc-
ure of the data, in which observations at the individual level are nested
ithin the country level. Given the nature of our dataset, and relying on
ryan and Jenkins (2016) (see also, for example, Perugini et al., 2019 ),
e deal with this multilevel structure by: (i) implementing a ﬁxed eﬀect
FE) estimation approach, i.e., pooled country surveys with the inclusion
f distinct country intercepts; and (ii) clustering standard errors at the
elevant (country/gender/age or country/gender) level. 
The basic form of the job satisfaction model is given by the following
quation: 
 𝑆 𝑖𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑒 𝑖𝑘 + 𝑋 ′𝑖𝑘𝑛 𝛾𝑛 + 𝑢 𝑘 + IMR 
′
𝑖𝑘𝑚 
𝜆𝑚 + 𝜀 𝑖𝑘 (2)
here i and k denote individuals and countries, respectively; u k denotes
ountry ﬁxed eﬀects, X ikn is the regressor matrix, 𝛾n the vector of asso-
iated coeﬃcients, IMR ′
𝑖𝑘𝑚 
𝜆m is a set of variables and associated coef-
cients used to correct for the selection eﬀects and ɛ ik represents the
rror term. The matrix X ikn consists of the control variables described in
ection 3.1 . The coeﬃcients 𝛽1 next to the dummy variable for gender
easures the adjusted gender-job satisfaction gap which, according to
lark (1997) , is a proxy for gender diﬀerences in expectations, as per-
onal characteristics and objective working conditions are controlled
or. Model (2) is applied to estimate adjusted gender-job satisfaction
ap in the whole sample and separately for every country. The set of
ariables that we are using is extensive and allows controlling for many
mportant aspects; however, it is not exhaustive. Therefore, caution is
eeded when interpreting the estimated adjusted job satisfaction gap
ince some important factors that may diﬀer across genders (e.g., job
enure) cannot be fully accounted for. 
Although job satisfaction is measured on a Likert type scale, which
roduces ordinal type variables, results from the measurement literature
e.g., Norman, 2010; Brown, 2011 ) suggest that ordinary least squares
OLS) estimates do not diﬀer in results or conclusions when applied to
nterval and Likert scale type measures. We therefore opt to estimateIA (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) assumption, which is an integral 
art of multinominal logit estimates, is too restrictive, and whether another 
odel, e.g. multinomial normal model is more appropriate. However, according 
o Bourguignon et al. (2007) , if the aim of the multinomial logit is the correc- 
ion of the selection bias in the outcome equation (rather than the estimation of 
he selection process itself) multinominal logit is, even if the IIA is severely vio- 
ated, a reasonable alternative to a multinomial normal model. As multinominal 
ogit is easier to implement then the multinomial normal model, and both yield 
onsistent estimates, we opted for the former. 
10 Unlike the original Dubin-McFadden (1984) method, which re- 
tricts the class of allowed distributions of the main equation residuals, 
ourguignon et al. (2007) correction allows main equation residuals to be 
ormally distributed, by normalizing selection equation residuals and assuming 
hat they are related linearly to the main equation residuals ( Bourguignon et al., 
007 , p. 179). As a robustness check of our results we also apply original Dubin- 
cFadden (1984) , estimation of the ﬁrst part of the model. Results based on 
hese estimates conﬁrm the results presented in the remaining part of the paper 
nd are available upon request. 
11 In order to estimate multinominal selection eﬀects we use selmlog stata pro- 
edure by Bourguignon et al. (2007) . 
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j  he model by using the OLS method, as we are then able to compare ad-
usted gender-job satisfaction gaps in diﬀerent countries. However, as a
obustness check for the analysis of the pooled data, we use ordinal pro-
it model and recode the job satisfaction variable into three categories:
ow (0–5), median (6–8) and high (9 and 10). 12 
For both procedures (OLS and probit) we use clustered standard
rrors at the relevant level. Although the covariates presented in the
q. (2) are individual-level variables, variables used to test the im-
act of the gender equality on the gender-job satisfaction gap are of
igher level of aggregation (country/gender/age or country/gender). As
hese indicators are constant within clusters, residuals of the observa-
ions might be correlated, resulting in biased estimates of the standard
rrors ( Moulton, 1986 ). In order to account for within-cluster correla-
ion we use parametric correction for the Moulton factor suggested by
ngrist and Pischke (2009) . 13 We further test the robustness of our re-
ults by applying both OLS and ordered probit estimates on the total
ample, without the matching restriction. 
.3. Baseline estimations 
Results of the estimation of the baseline model are presented in
able 1 . 14 In the ﬁrst two columns we report OLS estimates of Eq. (2) im-
lemented on the matched and full sample, respectively; columns 3 and
 report corresponding estimates from ordinal probit. All estimates in-
lude the correction for (multinomial) sample selection (IMR ratios at
he bottom of the table). Generally speaking, the signs of the coeﬃcients
n the selection equations (not reported here but available upon request)
re as expected and indicate that selection into dependent employment
s not random: the probability of being in dependent employment com-
ared to other labour market statuses increases with age (at diminishing
ate) and education levels. For women, being married and having chil-
ren decreases the likelihood of being in dependent employment, when
ompared to inactivity, while for unemployment and other employment
tatuses the eﬀects are mixed. For men, being married and having chil-
ren increases the likelihood of being in dependent employment, com-
ared to all other three conditions. Lastly, the likelihood of being in
ependent employment is lower for both genders in larger households
nd in households with elderly household members. The eﬀects of selec-
ion variables, as evidenced in the Table 1 , are statistically signiﬁcant,
egardless of the model and the sample, and suggest that selection vari-
bles do have an impact on the job satisfaction in our estimates. 15 
Results in Table 1 reveal a strong stability across alternative samples
nd estimators, with coeﬃcients for covariates in Eq. (2) , exhibiting12 In accordance with the Eurostat analysis of job satisfaction in Eu- 
ope: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Quality_of_ 
ife_in_Europe_-_facts_and_views_-_employment . 
13 We use moulton command provided at Mostly Harmless Economet- 
ics data archive website. Retrieved from http://economics.mit.edu/ 
aculty/angrist/data1/mhe/brl on 3/12/2018. We check the robustness of 
ur results by using country level clustering. The results, available upon request 
o not change the conclusions obtained from the estimates. 
14 Descriptive statistics of the variables (including the later indicators of gender 
quality) included in the analysis are presented in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
15 We also perform a robustness check of the results by using a simple Heck- 
an procedure. Results (available upon request) suggest that selection into de- 
endent employment is not random, while the eﬀects of selection variables are 
imilar to the ones observed in the multinominal model. Additionally, the eﬀect 
f IMR from the Heckman procedure is signiﬁcant, suggesting again that selec- 
ion variable has an impact on job satisfaction. We additionally estimated the 
ﬀects of the squared IMRs variables from the Bourguignon et al. (2007) pro- 
edure, to account for the possible non-linearity between the IMRs and job sat- 
sfaction. However, these estimates yielded very large values of the coeﬃcients 
nd standard errors, suggesting multicollinearity issues of such speciﬁcation. 
inally, we check the robustness of these results by using the original Dubin- 
cFadden (1984) method of multinominal selection. Results (available upon 
equest) also suggest that selection is not random, while the eﬀects of selection 
ariables are similar to the ones from the Bourguignon et al. (2007) procedure. 
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133 argely expected signs. In line with our theoretical model, job satisfac-
ion is higher for people who receive higher wages and lower for people
orking longer hours ( Bender et al., 2005; Linz and Semykina, 2013 ).
orking overtime (longer than 50 hours per week) has no stable addi-
ional eﬀect on job satisfaction, hence non-linear eﬀects of hours worked
n satisfaction do not clearly emerge from our results. Coeﬃcients for
oth age and age squared are signiﬁcant, indicating a well-known U-
haped relation between age and job satisfaction ( Linz and Semykina,
012; Ghinetti, 2007 ), while job satisfaction is higher for married indi-
iduals ( Clark, 1996; Linz and Semykina, 2012 ). Sectoral dummies indi-
ate that, compared to manufacturing, workers in public administration
NACE sector O), education (P), health (Q) and arts, sports and NGOs
ectors (R to U), have higher levels of job satisfaction, probably due to
he combination of higher intrinsic motivation for work and higher job
ecurity ( Buelens and Van den Broeck, 2007; Ghinetti, 2007 ). Intrin-
ic motivation and job security are also frequently used to explain two
ther results from our estimates - higher job satisfaction for working
n smaller ﬁrms and higher job satisfaction for working on permanent
ontracts ( Clark, 1996 ). Compared to elementary occupations, all other
ccupations have ceteris paribus higher levels of job satisfaction, the ef-
ects being the strongest for Managers (ISCO group 1) and Professionals
group 2). Lastly, in line with the argument from Section 2 , after con-
rolling for all other covariates, the eﬀects of education are negative,
ndicating higher work expectations of more educated workers ( Clark
nd Oswald, 1996; Bender et al., 2005 ). 
As all models in Table 1 yield similar results, for the following esti-
ates we rely on OLS, estimated on the matched sample in the follow-
ng empirical steps. Results with full sample and oprobit estimates are
argely consistent and available upon request. 
.4. Adjusted gender-job satisfaction gap in Europe 
We now turn to our main interest, gender diﬀerences in job satis-
action. The coeﬃcient for female in model (2) represents the so-called
djusted gap in job satisfaction, i.e., the gender diﬀerences in job sat-
sfaction once all other observable job and individual characteristics
re statistically controlled for. The estimated coeﬃcient for the gen-
er dummy (female = 1), regardless of the sample (matched or full)
nd estimation procedure (OLS or oprobit), is positive and statistically
igniﬁcant, indicating that on average, in the sample of 32 European
ountries (country-ﬁxed eﬀects included), women have a higher level of
ob satisfaction then men. However, we observe large diﬀerences across
ountries in the size and the sign of the job satisfaction adjusted gap
 Fig. 1 and Table A3 in the appendix, in which we also report the esti-
ated unadjusted gender gap). 
Our outcomes are only partially consistent with the existing evidence
eviewed in Section 2 . Job satisfaction is, ceteris paribus , higher for men
n seven countries of Central-Eastern Europe: Lithuania, Slovakia, Bul-
aria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Poland and Romania, as well as for Swe-
en, although this diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant only for Lithuania
nd Slovakia. In all other countries, women have higher job satisfac-
ion (conditional on covariates), although the diﬀerence is statistically
igniﬁcant only for the UK, Iceland, Malta, Cyprus, Portugal, Estonia,
ungary, Netherlands, France and Spain. 
. Current gender inequality and the job satisfaction paradox 
According to Clark’s conjecture (1997), after controlling for covari-
tes in model (2), the gender gap in job satisfaction reﬂects diﬀerences in
ork expectations between men and women: women tend to have lower
xpectations regarding their jobs, and are consequently more satisﬁed
than men) with the same job. As a consequence, we should expect that
he paradox exists in the countries with low levels of gender equality
similarly to Kaiser, 2007 ), since women in these countries have lower
ob expectations than men. 
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Table 1 
Estimation of the baseline speciﬁcation (summary of results). 
Matched sample OLS Full sample OLS Matched sample oprobit Full sample oprobit 
Female 0.068 ∗∗∗ (0.025) 0.044 ∗∗ (0.022) 0.043 ∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.029 ∗∗∗ (0.010) 
ln wage 0.353 ∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.318 ∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.189 ∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.167 ∗∗∗ (0.007) 
Hours − 0.010 ∗∗∗ (0.001) − 0.004 ∗∗∗ (0.001) − 0.006 ∗∗∗ (0.001) − 0.003 ∗∗∗ (0.001) 
Hours50 − 0.056 (0.038) − 0.118 ∗∗∗ (0.025) 0.015 (0.024) − 0.015 (0.016) 
Age − 0.053 ∗∗∗ (0.008) − 0.058 ∗∗∗ (0.007) − 0.034 ∗∗∗ (0.005) − 0.037 ∗∗∗ (0.004) 
Age 2 / 100 0.051 ∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.057 ∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.034 ∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.037 ∗∗∗ (0.005) 
Married 0.083 ∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.079 ∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.028 ∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.032 ∗∗∗ (0.009) 
Primary education (omitted) 
Secondary education − 0.289 ∗∗∗ (0.030) − 0.210 ∗∗∗ (0.022) − 0.183 ∗∗∗ (0.019) − 0.134 ∗∗∗ (0.013) 
Tertiary education − 0.416 ∗∗∗ (0.039) − 0.337 ∗∗∗ (0.028) − 0.254 ∗∗∗ (0.024) − 0.203 ∗∗∗ (0.017) 
Managers 0.822 ∗∗∗ (0.044) 0.726 ∗∗∗ (0.033) 0.483 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.418 ∗∗∗ (0.020) 
Professionals 0.708 ∗∗∗ (0.035) 0.622 ∗∗∗ (0.027) 0.401 ∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.349 ∗∗∗ (0.017) 
Technicians 0.603 ∗∗∗ (0.033) 0.530 ∗∗∗ (0.025) 0.339 ∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.295 ∗∗∗ (0.016) 
Clerks 0.492 ∗∗∗ (0.035) 0.434 ∗∗∗ (0.027) 0.265 ∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.233 ∗∗∗ (0.016) 
Service / sales workers 0.390 ∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.339 ∗∗∗ (0.025) 0.210 ∗∗∗ (0.021) 0.183 ∗∗∗ (0.016) 
Craft / trades workers 0.082 ∗∗ (0.038) 0.207 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.039 (0.024) 0.114 ∗∗∗ (0.017) 
Plant / mach. operators 0.172 ∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.221 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.085 ∗∗∗ (0.025) 0.117 ∗∗∗ (0.018) 
Elementary occupations (omitted) 
Sectors B-E (omitted) 
Sector F 0.107 ∗∗∗ (0.038) 0.037 (0.027) 0.047 ∗∗ (0.023) 0.017 (0.016) 
Sector G − 0.060 ∗∗ (0.028) − 0.020 (0.021) − 0.044 ∗∗ (0.018) − 0.021 (0.013) 
Sectors H - I 0.048 (0.031) 0.059 ∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.026 (0.019) 0.033 ∗∗ (0.014) 
Sectors J - K − 0.059 ∗ (0.031) − 0.041 (0.025) − 0.040 ∗∗ (0.019) − 0.025 ∗ (0.015) 
Sectors L - N − 0.025 (0.031) − 0.010 (0.024) − 0.006 (0.019) 0.006 (0.015) 
Sector O 0.210 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.254 ∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.122 ∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.146 ∗∗∗ (0.013) 
Sector P 0.398 ∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.419 ∗∗∗ (0.024) 0.240 ∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.251 ∗∗∗ (0.014) 
Sector Q 0.282 ∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.309 ∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.156 ∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.170 ∗∗∗ (0.013) 
Sectors R - U 0.374 ∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.441 ∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.212 ∗∗∗ (0.025) 0.245 ∗∗∗ (0.020) 
Additional job 0.040 (0.030) 0.030 (0.025) 0.038 ∗∗ (0.019) 0.028 ∗ (0.015) 
Firm size 1–10 (omitted) 
Firm size 11/19 − 0.103 ∗∗∗ (0.022) − 0.086 ∗∗∗ (0.018) − 0.053 ∗∗∗ (0.014) − 0.044 ∗∗∗ (0.011) 
Firm size 20/49 − 0.102 ∗∗∗ (0.022) − 0.080 ∗∗∗ (0.018) − 0.069 ∗∗∗ (0.014) − 0.054 ∗∗∗ (0.011) 
Firm size 50 + − 0.157 ∗∗∗ (0.019) − 0.131 ∗∗∗ (0.016) − 0.093 ∗∗∗ (0.012) − 0.081 ∗∗∗ (0.010) 
Temporary contract − 0.318 ∗∗∗ (0.030) − 0.257 ∗∗∗ (0.020) − 0.151 ∗∗∗ (0.020) − 0.121 ∗∗∗ (0.013) 
IMR1 (dep. employ.) − 0.114 ∗ (0.059) − 0.064 (0.047) − 0.075 ∗∗ (0.033) − 0.038 (0.026) 
IMR2 (oth. employ.) − 0.438 ∗∗∗ (0.155) − 0.294 ∗∗ (0.129) − 0.233 ∗∗∗ (0.079) − 0.156 ∗∗ (0.063) 
IMR3 (unemployed) 0.768 ∗∗∗ (0.176) 1.068 ∗∗∗ (0.143) 0.469 ∗∗∗ (0.096) 0.598 ∗∗∗ (0.074) 
IMR2 (inactive) − 0.270 ∗∗ (0.126) − 0.169 (0.104) − 0.137 ∗∗ (0.069) − 0.077 (0.057) 
Constant (cut 1) 6.491 ∗∗∗ (0.301) 6.793 ∗∗∗ (0.253) − 0.808 ∗∗∗ (0.142) − 0.961 ∗∗∗ (0.112) 
(Constant cut 2) 0.865 ∗∗∗ (0.142) 0.676 ∗∗∗ (0.112) 
(pseudo) r square 0.0899 0.0607 0.04 0.0374 
Observations 83,555 124,822 83,555 124,822 
Notes: Country-ﬁxed eﬀects omitted from the table and available upon request. Standard errors clustered at country/gender 
level (parametric correction for Moulton factor); Estimated coeﬃcients from the oprobit indicate the sign and signiﬁcance 
of the coeﬃcient, but cannot be interpreted as marginal eﬀects. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗ p < 0.1. 
Fig. 1. Adjusted gender-job satisfaction gap (female to male job satisfaction) by country. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on SILC data. 
Note: Full tables with estimations by single countries are available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 2 
Job satisfaction gender gap and current level of gender equality (OLS, matched sample). 
1 2 3 4 
Female 0.068 ∗∗∗ 0.068 ∗∗∗ 0.073 ∗∗∗ 0.066 ∗∗∗ 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Female ∗ Overall Gender Equality Index − 0.053 
(0.373) 
Female ∗ Economic Participation and Opportunity Score − 0.387 
(0.281) 
Female ∗ Political Empowerment Score 0.059 
(0.122) 
Notes: Gender equality indicators normalized at mean (i.e., variables have the mean at zero, while pre- 
serving the original variation). Multinomial selection eﬀects included. Full models results are presented 
in Table A4 in the appendix. Standard errors clustered at country/gender level (parametric correction 
for Moulton factor). Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗ p < 0.1. 
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(To test the eﬀects of gender equality explicitly, in Table 2 we aug-
ent Eq. (2) with an interaction of the gender dummy variable with
easures of gender equality. Indicators of current gender equality at
ountry level are taken from the World Economic Forum’s Global Gen-
er Gap Report 2013. We consider, in the ﬁrst place, the Gender Gap
ndex, which varies between 0 (maximum inequality) and 1 (equality);
his overall index is calculated as the un-weighted average of four sub-
ndexes (again ranging from 0 to 1) which describe four main gender
ap dimensions: economic participation and opportunity, educational
ttainment, health and survival, and political empowerment. The four
ub-indexes are calculated as weighted averages of 14 diﬀerent indica-
ors that form them (see WEF, 2013 , for details on the methodology and
he base indicators). 
The use of country ﬁxed eﬀects obviously prevents the inclusion of
dditional country-level predictors in the empirical model, since the
ountry intercepts already fully encapsulate cross-country diﬀerences
 Snijders and Bosker, 1999 ). However, additional country-level vari-
bles can be interacted with individual-level variables so as to obtain
he additional eﬀect that a country-level factor produces on the main
individual-level) eﬀect. The augmented model therefore reads: 
 𝑆 𝑖𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑓 𝑒 𝑚 𝑖𝑘 + 𝛽11 𝑓 𝑒 𝑚 𝑖𝑘 ∗ 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝐸 𝑞 𝑘 + 𝑋 ′𝑖𝑘𝑛 𝛾𝑛 + 𝑢 𝑘 + IMR 
′
𝑖𝑘𝑚 
𝜆𝑚 + 𝜀 𝑖𝑘 
(3) 
here 𝛽11 represents the impact of currently observed gender equality
n gender-job satisfaction gap and all other coeﬃcients and variables
re the same as in model (2). If higher gender equality contributes to in-
rease women’s job expectations (hence lowering their job satisfaction),
e should observe a negative sign for 𝛽11 . 
Table 2 (see Table A4 in the Appendix for complete results) indicates
hat the current level of gender equality in the country, as measured by
he WEF global gender index, is not signiﬁcantly correlated with the job
atisfaction gap. Replacing the global index with its two sub-components
hat show suﬃcient variability across countries 16 also indicates that the
urrent level of gender equality has no impact on the gender job satis-
action gap. 
One reason why a link between gender inequality and the job sat-
sfaction gap does not emerge in Table 2 could be related to the fact
hat observed contemporaneous gender inequality is not suﬃcient to
lign expectations of women to those of men. This might occur if, as
mphasised by the extensive literature reviewed in Section 2 , beliefs
nd preferences built and internalised in early stages of life tend to be
ersistent over time. Should this be the case, the currently observed low
evels of gender inequalities might not be suﬃcient to revise upwards
he low expectations built in early stages of life by having experienced16 Education and health indexes have limited variability across the countries 
ncluded in our analysis, ranging from 0.982 to 1 and from 0.964 to 0.980, 
espectively, and were not included in the analysis. Conversely, the participation 
ndex ranges from 0.565 to 0.836 and the political empowerment index from 
.057 to 0.754. Finally, the Gender Gap Index varies from 0.674 to 0.873. 
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135 and lived in context with) high gender inequality. In the following sec-
ion we empirically test this possibility. 
. Past gender inequality and the job satisfaction paradox 
.1. Job satisfaction and gender inequality in early stages of life 
The nature of our sample is particularly suited to our aims, since it in-
ludes European countries with very diﬀerent histories of gender equal-
ty, strictly related to their political and ideological systems. As a conse-
uence, people in a similar age and with similar characteristics, but who
rew up in diﬀerent countries, might have experienced very diﬀerent
ender inequality settings during their early stage of life. The emphasis
n economic and social equality was a hallmark of the socialist ideology;
efore the transition to market economy started in 1989, countries of
entral and Eastern Europe were actually able to maintain remarkably
qual distributions of income and were often identiﬁed as the most equal
ountries in the world ( Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992 ). In particular,
quality of men and women was proclaimed as one of the key ideologi-
al tenets of socialism ( Little, 2011 ), deeply rooted in the thinking of the
ounding fathers and emphasized as a key achievement of overcoming
apitalism which, by nature, favoured women’s oppression (see, for ex-
mple, Friedrich Engels in his 1884 book, The Origin of the Family, Pri-
ate Property and the State). Even though horizontal and vertical gen-
er segregation still penetrated many ﬁelds of social life ( Jurajda, 2003
nd 2005; Pollert, 2005 ) and family loads were largely asymmetric ( La
ont, 2001; Gal and Kligman, 2000 ), women’s participation in the labour
arket and their access to education, healthcare and political life were
ncomparably higher compared to Western Europe ( Blau and Ferber,
992; Brainerd, 2000 ). It is widely documented that this contributed to
he development of remarkably diﬀerent attitudes and beliefs about the
osition of women in the labour market and in society ( Blanchﬂower
nd Freeman, 1997; Campa and Seraﬁnelli, 2016; Lange, 2008; Fargher
t al., 2008 ). The transition to market economy started in the 1990s en-
ailed important changes in this regard too ( Vecernìk, 2003 ), not only
ecause the economic environment changed dramatically and forced
any men and women into unemployment or out of the labour force.
entral and Eastern European governments widely endorsed more con-
ervative gender policies, emphasizing women’s roles as mothers rather
han workers and making labour market participation more diﬃcult
 Pascall and Manning, 2000 ); at the same time, the change in regime
ed many citizens of post-communist economies to support market jus-
ice norms and outcomes merely in contradistinction to socialist norms
 Mason and Kluegel, 2000 ). 
As a consequence, while in western European countries younger co-
orts of women have been gradually exposed to more progressive and
ender-neutral policies, attitudes and environments compared to their
lder counterparts, the opposite has happened in Central and Eastern
urope. This might explain why the estimation of model 3 does not
rovide evidence of an impact of gender inequality on the gender-job
C. Perugini and M. Vladisavljevi ć Labour Economics 60 (2019) 129–147 
Fig. 2. Gender equality patterns across Europe (1960–2015). 
Source: Our elaborations from WDI and various sources (see footnote 17 ). 
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i  atisfaction paradox; the eﬀect of current equality simply does not ap-
ly to all women in the sample in the same way, and ignores the fact
hat gender equality has developed diﬀerently in diﬀerent countries. To
vercome this issue and investigate the direct link between historical
hanges in the gender equality and the gender-job satisfaction paradox,
e need to introduce this historical dimension directly into the model. 
To this aim we use the female/male participation (activity) rates
atio, one of the few available indicators of gender equality that can be
onstructed and traced back as close as possible to the age of birth of
he oldest respondents in our sample. 17 Fig. 2 provides a snapshot for
he (un-weighted) average levels of the indicator for Central Eastern and
estern Europe and for some selected countries since 1960 and clearly
hows how gender equality evolved quite diﬀerently in the two groups
f countries. 
In order to test the idea that early exposure to gender equal settings,
ia the proposed mechanism of values and beliefs (in this case regarding
ender roles and consequent expectations), aﬀects the current gender-
ob satisfaction paradox ( Clark, 1997; Loscocco and Spitze, 1991; Miller,
980 ) we construct an indicator of early life exposure to gender equal-
ty (ELGE) as the average of the female/male participation ratio over
he ﬁrst 20 years of life of each respondent in her/his country. 18 The
LGE indicator shows considerable variation as it ranges from 0.209 to
.915, with a mean at 0.622. Although this measure does not fully cap-
ure the cultural and social setting in which the individual was raised
in particular with reference to her/his family characteristics), it pro-
ides a broad measure of the socio-economic gender environment in
hich work relations between the genders and gender-job expectations
ere constructed. This variable (ELGE), normalized at the mean in order
o render the interpretation of remaining coeﬃcients more straightfor-17 The main data source was the World Bank World Development Indicators 
WDI), providing data from 1960 onwards for a large number of countries (vari- 
ble SL.TLF.CACT.FM.NE.ZS - Ratio of female to male labour force participation 
ate (%), national estimate). Missing data for Central and Eastern EU countries 
rior to 1989 were integrated using a large number of national speciﬁc informa- 
ion, which include: Godfrey and Richards (1997); Kinsella and Taeuber (1993), 
lias (1972); Fullerton (1999); Sorrentino (1983); Statistics of the USSR (vari- 
us years, in Russia); Federal Statistical Oﬃce of Yugoslavia (various years, in 
erbian) . The remaining few missing data (for both Central Eastern and Western 
ountries) were reconstructed by linear interpolation. 
18 Our sample includes individuals born from 1949 to 1994. For the18,102 
ndividuals born before 1960 (about 21 percent of the sample) the average of 
he gender equality indicator is calculated on a smaller number of years, as the 
ata on gender inequality are available only up to 1960. 
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136 ard, is then merged by country and age with the EU-SILC data and
nteracted with the gender dummy so as to estimate the model: 
 𝑆 𝑖𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑓𝑒 𝑚 𝑖𝑘 + 𝛽2 𝐸 𝐿𝐺𝐸 𝑖𝑘 + 𝛽12 𝑓𝑒 𝑚 𝑖𝑘 ∗ 𝐸 𝐿𝐺 𝐸 𝑖𝑘 + 𝑋 ′𝑖𝑘𝑛 𝛾𝑛 
+ IMR ′
𝑖𝑘𝑚 
𝜆𝑚 + 𝑢 𝑘 + 𝜀 𝑖𝑘 (4) 
here 𝛽12 indicates the impact of exposure to gender equality in child-
ood and youth on the gender-job satisfaction gap, and all other coeﬃ-
ients and variables are the same as in model 2. 19 
In line with our expectations 𝛽12 is negative (Column 2 in Table 3 ,
ee Table A5 for full results), indicating that increase in ELGE, which
ignals the advancement of gender equality, is indeed related to lower
evels of the gender-job satisfaction gap. Women who spent their child-
ood and youth in contexts with higher female-to-male participation ra-
ios have statistically lower job satisfaction than their counterparts who
ere exposed to more gender unequal environments, while we ﬁnd no
uch eﬀects for men (coeﬃcient 𝛽2 is not signiﬁcant). This corroborates
he idea that surrounding context in early stages of life is, via develop-
ent and internalisation of beliefs about gender roles and expectations,
mong the drivers of the gender-job satisfaction paradox. 20 
As ELGE is normalized to zero, the coeﬃcient next to female in col-
mn 2 ( 𝛽1 from Eq. (4) ) has the interpretation of the adjusted gender-job
atisfaction gap conditional on and at the average level of ELGE (0.622).
able 2 indicates that the average gap remains positive and signiﬁcant.
he signiﬁcant interaction term of variables female and ELGE enables
s to calculate the gender-job satisfaction gap (i.e., marginal eﬀects of
oeﬃcient next to female) at diﬀerent levels of ELGE. The calculation of
he marginal eﬀects indicates that gender-job satisfaction gap becomes
nsigniﬁcant at the ELGE level of about 0.7. In other words, according19 In order to make its eﬀects more visible we multiply the ELGE indicator by 
00. 
20 To further corroborate our results we assembled a new database in which the 
bservations represent ﬁve diﬀerent ages (20, 30, 40, 50 and 60) in 32 countries 
i.e. 5 ∗ 32 = 160 observations). The variables in this database are: (i) the adjusted 
ap in gender job satisfaction, calculated as marginal eﬀects of gender at diﬀer- 
nt age using the EU-SILC database; and (ii) female-to-male participation ratios 
rom the database on historical development of gender equality, matched again 
y age and country. We then performed a regression analysis in which the de- 
endent variable is the gender-job satisfaction gap and the main regressor is the 
emale to male participation ratio. Results are displayed in Fig. A1 , and the esti- 
ated coeﬃcient from the regression analysis is approximately equal to the one 
resented in Table 3 ( b = − 0.436, SE b = 0.123; p < 0.01). Results conﬁrm the 
vidence of lower gender-job satisfaction gap being associated to higher ELGE 
ndex. 
C. Perugini and M. Vladisavljevi ć Labour Economics 60 (2019) 129–147 
Table 3 
Job satisfaction gender gap and gender equality in early stages of life (OLS, matched sample). 
1 2 3 4 5 
Female 0.068 ∗∗∗ 0.069 ∗∗∗ 0.070 ∗∗∗ 0.052 ∗∗ 0.110 ∗∗∗ 
(0.025) (0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.021) 
Early Life Gender Equality (ELGE) Index − 0.029 − 0.041 − 0.036 − 0.081 
(0.155) (0.156) (0.155) (0.155) 
Female ∗ ELGE Index − 0.411 ∗∗∗ − 0.385 ∗∗∗ − 0.407 ∗∗∗ − 0.342 ∗∗∗ 
(0.082) (0.089) (0.083) (0.083) 
Female ∗ Age 0.001 
(0.001) 
Female ∗ Tertiary Education (ED) 0.031 
(0.028) 
Female ∗ Male Occupation (Mocc) − 0.248 ∗∗∗ 
(0.035) 
Notes: ELGE index and age normalized at mean (i.e. variables have mean at zero, while preserving the 
original variation). Multinomial selection eﬀects included. Full models results are presented in Table A5 in 
the appendix. Standard errors clustered at country/gender/age level (parametric correction for Moulton 
factor). Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗ p < 0.1. 
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t  o our model, women exposed in their early childhood to female partic-
pation rates that represent 70% or more of the male participation rates
ill, on average, have the same job satisfaction as men, conditional on
ther controlled factors. 
In columns 3 to 5 we test the robustness of the observed eﬀect of
LGE by including the interaction of the gender dummy with variables
escribing age (normalized at mean so to preserve the interpretation of
he coeﬃcient next to female), education and male occupations. Such
ndicators are those identiﬁed and used by Clark to corroborate his con-
ecture about the role of women’s expectations in shaping the job sat-
sfaction gap; younger age, higher levels of education and employment
n male-dominated occupations should help women re-align their ex-
ectations to those of men. While the age variable is simply expressed
n years, the attainment of a high education level ( ED ) is a dichotomic
ariable that equals one if the individual completed tertiary education
nd zero otherwise. Male occupations are those in which the majority
f the workers are male and the variable for male occupations ( Mocc ) is
oded as 1 for: managers, crafts and trade workers and plant machine
perators (in which men account for about 61%, 86% and 75% of em-
loyment respectively) and zero otherwise. 21 
Results indicate that the eﬀect of ELGE is robust to the inclusion
f all additional cross-terms. The non-signiﬁcance of the additional in-
eraction in column 3 indicates that ELGE already captures the eﬀect
hat Clark attributes, indirectly, to age (i.e., weaker or no paradox for
ounger cohorts due to exposure to more gender equal contexts). How-
ver, ELGE has the advantage of including more reﬁned and accurate
nformation (associating to each age a country-speciﬁc level of expo-
ure to gender inequality in early stages of life) and therefore direct
vidence on the link between gender equality and the job satisfaction
aradox. 22 While our results do not supply evidence of higher levels
f education being associated with a smaller extent of the paradox (col-21 Level terms of age, education and occupations are already included as co- 
ariates in the baseline speciﬁcation. Similar results, available upon request, 
re obtained when we replace the dummy variable (Mocc) with country spe- 
iﬁc share of men by occupation. 
22 When ELGE variable and Female ∗ ELGE term are left out of the speciﬁcation 
he interaction term Female ∗ Age becomes statistically signiﬁcant ( b = 0.004; 
.e. = 0.001; p < 0.01; results available upon request), and we therefore replicate 
he result from Clark (1997) . The fact that after the inclusion of ELGE variable 
nd Female ∗ ELGE the eﬀect of Female ∗ Age disappears further strengthens our 
onclusion that ELGE captures the eﬀects improvement of the gender equal- 
ty much better than age. Investigating the notion of eﬀects of diﬀerent gender 
quality settings via interacting the gender variable with age assumes that im- 
rovement of gender equality was linear with the age of the respondents, and 
hat gender equality developed in the same way in all the countries. Fig. 2 il- 
ustrates that this assumption does not stand, and our results conﬁrm that the 
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137 mn 4), the eﬀect of the gender structure of occupations is signiﬁcant. 23 
esults in column 5 indicate that while women in female-dominated
ectors on average have higher job satisfaction than men (coeﬃcient
emale ), the opposite is true for male-dominated sectors (the negative
oeﬃcient of the interaction term female ∗ Mocc overweighs the positive
ne of female). In an interpretative framework centred on expectations,
his means that being exposed to male-dominated working environment
an enable women to revise their beliefs and align expectations to those
f men. The fact that both interactions with ELGE and gender structure
f occupations are signiﬁcant indicates that this mechanism and the one
hannelled by ELGE have independent eﬀects on lowering the job satis-
action gaps. 
We further test robustness of the ELGE indicator eﬀect by including
urrent equality indicators from the WEF global gender index (presented
n Table 2 ). Table A6 in the Appendix indicates that inclusion of these
ndicators has no eﬀect on the impact of ELGE on the job satisfaction
ap; as in Table 2 , indicators of current gender equality have no eﬀect on
he job satisfaction gap. Further robustness checks performed on the full
ample, with oprobit estimator and with multinominal selection eﬀects,
onﬁrm the sign and signiﬁcance of the 𝛽12 coeﬃcient and are available
pon request. 
.2. Heterogeneous eﬀects of early life gender equality across education 
roups and occupations 
As a last step of our analysis, we investigate whether the eﬀects of
LGE are heterogeneous across education groups or gender structure of
ccupations. To answer this question we augment model (4) by another,
riple interaction term obtained by multiplying the gender dummy, the
normalized) ELGE index and the indicators for higher levels of educa-
ion and male-dominated occupations ( ED and Mocc) deﬁned above. The
wo empirical models, that also include all relevant double interaction
erms, read: 
 𝑆 𝑖𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑓𝑒 𝑚 𝑖𝑘 + 𝛽2 𝐸 𝐿𝐺 𝐸 𝑖𝑘 + 𝛽12 𝑓𝑒 𝑚 𝑖𝑘 ∗ 𝐸 𝐿𝐺 𝐸 𝑖𝑘 + 𝛽13 𝑓𝑒 𝑚 𝑖𝑘 
∗ 𝐸 𝐷 𝑖𝑘 + 𝛽23 𝐸𝐿𝐺 𝐸 𝑖𝑘 ∗ 𝐸 𝐷 𝑖𝑘 + 𝛽123 𝑓𝑒 𝑚 𝑖𝑘 ∗ 𝐸𝐿𝐺 𝐸 𝑖𝑘 ∗ 𝐸 𝐷 𝑖𝑘 
+ 𝑋 ′𝑖𝑘𝑛 𝛾𝑛 + 𝑢 𝑘 + IMR ′ 𝜆𝑚 + 𝜀 𝑖𝑘 (5) 𝑖𝑘𝑚 
omplex and diverse histories of gender inequalities have a higher explanatory 
ower of the job satisfaction paradox than age. 
23 When ELGE variable and Female ∗ ELGE term are left out of the speciﬁca- 
ion, we obtain similar results as in the Table 3 (results available upon request). 
nteraction of female and education is not statistically signiﬁcant, while the in- 
eraction with the male-dominated occupations variable is signiﬁcant and the 
oeﬃcient is very similar ( b = − 0.266; s.e. = 0.035; p < 0.01). Therefore, the 
ntroduction of ELGE does not change the interpretation of these results. 
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Table 4 
Heterogeneous eﬀects of ELGE across education groups and occupations (OLS, matched sample) (summary). 
1 2 3 
Female 0.069 ∗∗∗ (0.020) 0.076 ∗∗∗ (0.026) 0.110 ∗∗∗ (0.021) 
Early Life Gender Equality (ELGE) Index − 0.029 (0.155) − 0.285 ∗ (0.166) − 0.078 (0.160) 
Female ∗ ELGE Index − 0.411 ∗∗∗ (0.082) − 0.577 ∗∗∗ (0.109) − 0.340 ∗∗∗ (0.093) 
Female ∗ Tertiary Education 0.009 (0.028) 
ELGE Index ∗ Tertiary Education 0.576 ∗∗∗ (0.123) 
Female ∗ ELGE Index ∗ Tertiary Education 0.343 ∗∗ (0.159) 
Female ∗ Male-dominated occupations − 0.245 ∗∗∗ (0.036) 
ELGE Index ∗ Male-dominated occupations − 0.012 (0.134) 
Female ∗ ELGE Index ∗ Male-dominated occupations − 0.042 (0.211) 
Notes: ELGE index normalized at mean (i.e. the variable has mean at zero, while preserving the original variation). Multi- 
nomial selection eﬀects included. Full models results are presented in table A7 in the appendix. Standard errors clustered at 
country/gender/age level (parametric correction for Moulton factor). Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗ p < 0.1. 
Table 5 
Marginal eﬀects of ELGE indicator for men and women at diﬀerent education 
levels and for female and male dominated occupations. 
Marginal effects of ELGE for different levels of education 
Men (primary or secondary education) − 0.285 ∗ (0.166) 
Men (tertiary education) 0.291 (0.173) 
Women (primary or secondary education) − 0.863 ∗∗∗ (0.175) 
Women (tertiary education) 0.056 (0.171) 
Marginal effects of ELGE for female and male-dominated occupations 
Men (female-dominated occupations) − 0.078 (0.160) 
Men (male-dominated occupations) − 0.091 (0.178) 
Women (female-dominated occupations) − 0.418 ∗∗∗ (0.144) 
Women (male-dominated occupations) − 0.472 ∗∗ (0.213) 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗ p < 0.1. Marginal eﬀects calculated after the estimation 
of the model presented in Table 4 (full model in Table A7 in the appendix). 
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C   𝑆 𝑖𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑓𝑒 𝑚 𝑖𝑘 + 𝛽2 𝐸 𝐿𝐺 𝐸 𝑖𝑘 + 𝛽12 𝑓𝑒 𝑚 𝑖𝑘 ∗ 𝐸 𝐿𝐺 𝐸 𝑖𝑘 
+ 𝛽13 𝑓𝑒 𝑚 𝑖𝑘 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑐 𝑐 𝑖𝑘 + 𝛽23 𝐸𝐿𝐺 𝐸 𝑖𝑘 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑐 𝑐 𝑖𝑘 + 𝛽123 𝑓𝑒 𝑚 𝑖𝑘 
∗ 𝐸𝐿𝐺 𝐸 𝑖𝑘 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑐 𝑐 𝑖𝑘 + 𝑋 ′𝑖𝑘𝑛 𝛾𝑛 + 𝑢 𝑘 + IMR ′𝑖𝑘𝑚 𝜆𝑚 + 𝜀 𝑖𝑘 (6)
In model (5) 𝛽123 indicates whether exposure to gender equality
etting in early life produces diﬀerent eﬀects on job satisfaction for
omen with tertiary education compared to their female counterparts
ith identical characteristics but lower levels of education. Similarly,
n model (6), the same coeﬃcient describes the diﬀerential eﬀect of
LGE produced by holding a job in a male dominated occupation. Due
o normalization of the ELGE variable all the coeﬃcients next to con-
tant terms (Female, Female ∗ Tertiary Education, and Female ∗ Tertiary
ale-dominated occupations) should be interpreted as marginal eﬀects
t mean levels of ELGE (0.622) in our sample. 
With reference to the double interaction terms, results from the es-
imation of models (5) and (6) ( Tables 4 and A7 ) conﬁrm the result
resented in Table 3: while there are no diﬀerences between education
evels in the size of the gender-job satisfaction gap, women in female-
ominated sectors on average have higher job satisfaction than men, at
he average level of ELGE indicator. 
However, the signiﬁcance of the triple interaction term of model (5)
ndicates that the impact of ELGE on the job satisfaction gap is hetero-
eneous across education levels. As the nature of the triple interaction
peciﬁcation does not allow easy interpretation of the coeﬃcients, we
ompute the marginal eﬀects of ELGE indicator for women and men at
iﬀerent levels of education and present them in Table 5 . Results in the
op panel indicate that for both men and women with lower levels of
ducation ELGE decreases job satisfaction. However, while the eﬀect is
imited and only marginally signiﬁcant for men (at 0.1 level), it is much
tronger and signiﬁcant for women (as indicated by Female ∗ ELGE Index
erm in column 2 of Table 4 ). In other words, higher ELGE lowers job
atisfaction for both genders, but much more for women, leading to the
onclusion that higher ELGE decreases the gender-job satisfaction gap138 mong those with lower levels of education. On the other hand, ELGE
as no eﬀect on either men or women with tertiary education, indicating
hat, for the pool of the highly educated the reasons behind gender dif-
erences in job satisfaction do not lie in exposure to gender inequalities
n the early stages of life. 
On the other hand, the triple interaction between gender, gender
tructure of occupations and ELGE ( Table 4 , column 3) is not signif-
cant, suggesting that ELGE lowers the gender-job satisfaction gap in
oth female and male dominated sectors, as conﬁrmed by marginal ef-
ects reported in Table 5 . 
. Discussion and conclusions 
In 1997, Andrew Clark proposed an explanation of the gender-
ob satisfaction paradox – the paradox of women’s higher job satisfac-
ion despite lower wages and poorer working conditions – based on
omen’s lower expectations from work. In the conclusion of his article,
lark (1997) suggested that such lower expectations are at least partially
ormulated early in life, under the inﬂuence of the observed position of
omen in the labour market. He further argued that the paradox is tran-
itory and that advances in gender equality will diminish such gender
iﬀerences in expectations. Therefore, Clark adumbrated a somewhat
ounterintuitive, but intriguing idea that the higher the gender equal-
ty is in a country, the lower women’s “advantage ” in job satisfaction is
ompared to men. This hypothesis was not tested explicitly by Clark in
is 1997 work. Research that followed Clark’s line of argumentation by
omparing gender-job satisfaction gaps between countries or across time
rovided only descriptive evidence, since the link between gender-job
atisfaction gap and gender equality was never econometrically mod-
lled and the conclusions reached, as the authors themselves admitted,
ﬀered room for diﬀerent interpretations ( Kaiser, 2007; Sousa-Poza and
ousa-Poza, 2000, 2003 ). 
In this paper, we aimed at ﬁlling this gap by providing explicit econo-
etric evidence on the link between gender equality and the gender-job
atisfaction paradox. We analysed the EU-SILC data for 32 countries for
013 and applied the nearest neighbour matching procedure to address
otential misspeciﬁcation and comparability issues. Our analysis indi-
ates that women in Europe, once all other possible drivers are con-
rolled for, have on average higher levels of job satisfaction than men.
e also show that there is a considerable variation in the gender-job
atisfaction gap across Europe. 
We ﬁrst attempted to explain this cross-country heterogeneity by
erging the EU-SILC data with the data on current levels of gender in-
quality, in order to explicitly test the hypothesis that the variability
n gender inequality is behind countries’ diﬀerences in gender-job satis-
action gaps. Our results indicate that contemporaneously observed lev-
ls of gender inequality (measured via WEF’s Gender equality indices)
o not have an impact on the size of the satisfaction gap. However, as
lark argued, it is the gender equality in early stages of life , rather than
C. Perugini and M. Vladisavljevi ć Labour Economics 60 (2019) 129–147 
c  
i
 
i  
t  
m  
p  
k  
(  
p  
h  
d  
t  
d  
e  
i  
a  
a  
s  
e  
t  
s
 
i  
s  
w  
m  
a  
s  
t  
i  
c  
o  
f
 
t  
e  
m  
s  
r  
t  
e  
b  
q  
f  
o  
t  
p  
f  
a  
j  
e  
i  
p  
g  
s  
i  
i
F
 
e  
p  
ﬁ  
p  
v
C
 
t
A
 
m  
a  
f  
C  urrent levels of gender equality, that might have a crucial role in shap-
ng expectations and therefore the size of the paradox. 
To test this possibility, we attempted to place diﬀerences in gender
nequalities across countries in their historical context by taking advan-
age of the geographical coverage of our sample. In order to explicitly
odel the idea that higher job satisfaction of women depends on ex-
osure, in early life, to the poor position of women in the labour mar-
et, we construct an indicator of early life exposure to gender equality
ELGE). This is deﬁned as the average female-to-male labour market
articipation ratio in the ﬁrst 20 years of life of each respondent in
er/his country. Results clearly indicate that exposure to higher gen-
er equality in early stages of life is strongly and robustly connected
o the lower levels of gender-job satisfaction gap and, therefore, to a
ecline of the paradox. Results also show that, independently of ELGE,
mployment in typically male occupations also decreases female job sat-
sfaction, even to a level lower than male. On the other hand, education,
lthough it has no direct eﬀect on gender-job satisfaction paradox, plays
 moderating role: signiﬁcant and sizable eﬀects of ELGE on gender-job
atisfaction gap materialize only for low and medium-educated work-
rs. For workers with tertiary education some other factors (not inves-
igated in our paper) can be the source of the gender diﬀerences in job
atisfaction. 
The lowering eﬀect of ELGE on the gender-job satisfaction paradox
s consistent with the idea that gender inequality experienced in early
tages of life has a persistent eﬀect on beliefs and expectations: women
ho lived in more gender-equal contexts during childhood and youth
ight have developed expectations, and reported job satisfaction, more
ligned to men’s. Similarly, women who lived in less equal societies, be-
ides developing lower expectations drawn from observing lower par-
icipation of women in the labour market, might have been “social-
zed ” to put higher value on aspects of work such as ﬂexibility and so-
ial connections, which translates into higher job satisfaction then men
nce wages and other individual and job characteristics are controlled
or. 
This interpretation draws attention to one of the aspects of subjec-
ive measures of well-being, such as job satisfaction, which have been
xposed to criticism in previous research: their ability to deal with
echanisms of psychological adaptation ( Frey and Strtzer, 2002 ). De-
pite being in very diﬀerent objective conditions, two individuals could
eport similar levels of satisfaction due to adaptation (to) and accep-139 ance of them by the one being worse-oﬀ. At the same time, how-
ver, Sen (1999) recognises that people’s judgments may be constrained
y political and social conditions, rather than psychology. As a conse-
uence, any action able to play a constructive role in reducing obstacles
or people to determine their own values or priorities is important not
nly for intrinsic reasons, but also because it allows people to be free
o come to their own decisions (an essential point in the capability ap-
roach). This is a crucial logical step in drawing policy implications
rom our results, which would otherwise sound paradoxical: measures
imed at reducing gender inequality would result, years later, in lower
ob satisfaction (and well-being) of women, due to alignment of their
xpectations to those of men. Lower gender inequalities, besides hav-
ng an intrinsic value, would enable women to shape expectations and
references not downward biased by the circumstances in which they
rew up, but equal to men’s. This would facilitate the formulation of
elf-reﬂective and deliberate judgments and relevant decision making
n all fundamental, and intertwined, domains of life (work and family
n particular). 
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Job satisfaction 
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checks. 
Female Gender dummy (female = 1) 
Covariates 
Ln wage Log of monthly wage 
Hours Number of hours usually worked per week in main
Hours50 Dummy variable if person is working 50 h or more
Married Marital status dummy (married = 1) 
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Note: Agriculture (section A) excluded, see Section 3.
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Firm size (20–49) Medium-large ﬁrm size dummy (between 20 and 4
Firm size (over 50) Large ﬁrm size dummy (over 50 employees = 1) 
Temporary contracts Employment status dummy (temporary = 1) 
Gender equality indicators 
Overall GEI Overall Gender Equality Index (Source: World Econom
EP Score Economic Participation and Opportunity Score (Sourc
PE Score Political Empowerment Score (Source: World Econom
ELGE Index Early life Exposure to Gender Equality Index (WDI an
Selection variables 
IMR1 Inverse Mills Ratio based on the probability to be in 
IMR2 Inverse Mills Ratio based on the probability to be in 
IMR3 Inverse Mills Ratio based on the probability to be un
IMR4 Inverse Mills Ratio based on the probability to be ina140 ﬁed ” to 10 “I’m completely satisﬁed ” (PW010) 
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Table A2 
Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the job satisfaction model (matched sample). 
Observations Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Job satisfaction 83,555 7.3 1.9 0 10 
Female 83,555 0.558 0.497 0 1 
Ln wage 83,555 7.2 1.1 0.0 11.6 
Hours 83,555 38.6 7.2 1 99 
Hours50 83,555 0.042 0.202 0 1 
Age 83,555 44.4 10.2 19 64 
Age2 / 100 83,555 20.7 8.9 3.6 41.0 
Married 83,555 0.615 0.487 0 1 
Secondary education 83,555 0.445 0.497 0 1 
Tertiary education 83,555 0.460 0.498 0 1 
Senior oﬃcials and managers 83,555 0.053 0.225 0 1 
Professionals 83,555 0.275 0.447 0 1 
Technicians and ass. professionals 83,555 0.185 0.388 0 1 
Clerks 83,555 0.108 0.311 0 1 
Service and sales workers 83,555 0.172 0.377 0 1 
Craft and trades workers 83,555 0.082 0.274 0 1 
Plant and machine operators 83,555 0.056 0.229 0 1 
Sector F 83,555 0.038 0.192 0 1 
Sector G 83,555 0.130 0.336 0 1 
Sectors H - I 83,555 0.078 0.268 0 1 
Sectors J - K 83,555 0.079 0.270 0 1 
Sectors L - N 83,555 0.082 0.274 0 1 
Sector O 83,555 0.119 0.324 0 1 
Sector P 83,555 0.131 0.337 0 1 
Sector Q 83,555 0.130 0.336 0 1 
Sectors R - U 83,555 0.038 0.191 0 1 
Additional job 83,555 0.051 0.221 0 1 
Firm size 11/19 83,555 0.156 0.363 0 1 
Firm size 20/49 83,555 0.171 0.376 0 1 
Firm size 50 + 83,555 0.455 0.498 0 1 
Temporary contract 83,555 0.058 0.234 0 1 
Overall GEI 83,555 0.731 0.047 0.674 0.873 
EP Score 83,555 0.699 0.062 0.566 0.836 
PE Score 83,555 0.253 0.142 0.057 0.754 
ELGE Index 83,555 0.622 0.169 0.209 0.915 
Fig. A1. Job satisfaction gender gap and gender equality in early stages of life, by age group. 
Notes: Estimated based on the regression analysis in which the dependent variable is the country-level gender-job satisfaction gap at diﬀerent ages (20, 30, 40, 50 and 
60) and the only regressor is the female to male participation ratio. Estimated coeﬃcient from the regression analysis is approximately equal to the one presented 
in Table 3 ( b = − 0.436, SE b = 0.123; p < 0.01, full results and data for the estimation available upon request). Results conﬁrm the evidence of lower gender-job 
satisfaction gap being associated to higher ELGE index. 
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Table A3 
Unadjusted and adjusted gender gaps in job satisfaction by country (OLS, matched 
sample). 
Unadjusted gap Adjusted gap 
all 0.080 ∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.068 ∗∗∗ (0.014) 
AT 0.178 ∗∗ (0.073) 0.138 (0.084) 
BE 0.115 ∗∗ (0.057) 0.101 (0.066) 
BG − 0.019 (0.090) − 0.130 (0.095) 
CH 0.047 (0.055) 0.015 (0.069) 
CY 0.240 ∗∗∗ (0.080) 0.230 ∗∗∗ (0.082) 
CZ − 0.122 ∗ (0.070) − 0.046 (0.077) 
DE 0.028 (0.056) 0.060 (0.065) 
DK 0.050 (0.093) 0.092 (0.106) 
EE 0.059 (0.078) 0.215 ∗∗ (0.091) 
EL − 0.129 (0.096) 0.067 (0.094) 
ES 0.142 ∗∗∗ (0.051) 0.105 ∗ (0.055) 
FI 0.159 ∗∗∗ (0.054) 0.100 (0.061) 
FR 0.124 ∗∗ (0.058) 0.108 ∗ (0.062) 
HR 0.070 (0.141) − 0.103 (0.150) 
HU 0.192 ∗∗∗ (0.055) 0.130 ∗∗ (0.059) 
IE 0.063 (0.135) 0.205 (0.150) 
IS 0.185 (0.146) 0.336 ∗∗ (0.162) 
IT 0.078 (0.049) 0.077 (0.054) 
LT − 0.148 ∗∗ (0.073) − 0.228 ∗∗∗ (0.078) 
LU 0.112 (0.095) 0.061 (0.103) 
LV 0.128 ∗ (0.074) 0.037 (0.084) 
MT 0.230 ∗ (0.121) 0.257 ∗ (0.135) 
NL 0.042 (0.049) 0.115 ∗∗ (0.058) 
NO 0.083 (0.068) 0.065 (0.079) 
PL 0.091 ∗ (0.055) − 0.031 (0.063) 
PT 0.202 ∗∗ (0.090) 0.225 ∗∗ (0.100) 
RO − 0.033 (0.049) − 0.026 (0.055) 
RS 0.200 ∗ (0.118) 0.155 (0.110) 
SE − 0.067 (0.087) − 0.095 (0.096) 
SI 0.213 ∗∗ (0.099) 0.146 (0.108) 
SK − 0.100 (0.061) − 0.181 ∗∗ (0.073) 
UK 0.287 ∗∗∗ (0.071) 0.353 ∗∗∗ (0.079) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗ p < 0.1. The 
unadjusted gap is estimated by running model (2) country by country with only the 
gender dummy on the right hand side. 
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Table A4 
Job satisfaction gender gap and current gender equality (OLS, matched sample). 
1 2 3 4 
Female 0.068 ∗∗∗ (0.025) 0.068 ∗∗∗ (0.025) 0.073 ∗∗∗ (0.025) 0.066 ∗∗∗ (0.025) 
Female ∗ Overall GEI − 0.053 (0.373) 
Female ∗ EP Score − 0.387 (0.281) 
Female ∗ PE Score 0.059 (0.122) 
Ln wage 0.353 ∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.352 ∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.352 ∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.353 ∗∗∗ (0.017) 
Hours − 0.010 ∗∗∗ (0.001) − 0.010 ∗∗∗ (0.001) − 0.010 ∗∗∗ (0.001) − 0.010 ∗∗∗ (0.001) 
Hours50 − 0.056 (0.038) − 0.056 (0.038) − 0.055 (0.038) − 0.057 (0.038) 
Age − 0.053 ∗∗∗ (0.008) − 0.007 ∗∗∗ (0.001) − 0.007 ∗∗∗ (0.001) − 0.007 ∗∗∗ (0.001) 
Age 2 / 100 0.051 ∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.001 ∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.001 ∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.001 ∗∗∗ (0.000) 
Married 0.083 ∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.083 ∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.081 ∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.084 ∗∗∗ (0.017) 
Primary education (omitted) 
Secondary education − 0.289 ∗∗∗ (0.030) − 0.289 ∗∗∗ (0.030) − 0.293 ∗∗∗ (0.030) − 0.289 ∗∗∗ (0.030) 
Tertiary education − 0.416 ∗∗∗ (0.039) − 0.416 ∗∗∗ (0.039) − 0.422 ∗∗∗ (0.039) − 0.415 ∗∗∗ (0.039) 
Managers 0.822 ∗∗∗ (0.044) 0.822 ∗∗∗ (0.044) 0.822 ∗∗∗ (0.044) 0.821 ∗∗∗ (0.044) 
Professionals 0.708 ∗∗∗ (0.035) 0.708 ∗∗∗ (0.035) 0.709 ∗∗∗ (0.035) 0.708 ∗∗∗ (0.035) 
Technicians 0.603 ∗∗∗ (0.033) 0.603 ∗∗∗ (0.033) 0.604 ∗∗∗ (0.033) 0.603 ∗∗∗ (0.033) 
Clerks 0.492 ∗∗∗ (0.035) 0.492 ∗∗∗ (0.035) 0.492 ∗∗∗ (0.035) 0.491 ∗∗∗ (0.035) 
Service / sales workers 0.390 ∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.390 ∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.391 ∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.389 ∗∗∗ (0.031) 
Craft / trades workers 0.082 ∗∗ (0.038) 0.082 ∗∗ (0.038) 0.083 ∗∗ (0.038) 0.081 ∗∗ (0.038) 
Plant / mach. operators 0.172 ∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.172 ∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.173 ∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.172 ∗∗∗ (0.040) 
Elementary occupations (omitted) 
Sectors B-E (omitted) 
Sector F 0.107 ∗∗∗ (0.038) 0.107 ∗∗∗ (0.038) 0.107 ∗∗∗ (0.037) 0.106 ∗∗∗ (0.038) 
Sector G − 0.060 ∗∗ (0.028) − 0.060 ∗∗ (0.028) − 0.060 ∗∗ (0.028) − 0.060 ∗∗ (0.028) 
Sectors H - I 0.048 (0.031) 0.048 (0.031) 0.048 (0.031) 0.048 (0.031) 
Sectors J - K − 0.059 ∗ (0.031) − 0.059 ∗ (0.031) − 0.060 ∗ (0.031) − 0.059 ∗ (0.031) 
Sectors L - N − 0.025 (0.031) − 0.025 (0.031) − 0.026 (0.031) − 0.025 (0.031) 
Sector O 0.210 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.210 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.210 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.209 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 
Sector P 0.398 ∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.398 ∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.398 ∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.398 ∗∗∗ (0.029) 
Sector Q 0.282 ∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.282 ∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.283 ∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.281 ∗∗∗ (0.029) 
Sectors R - U 0.374 ∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.374 ∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.373 ∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.374 ∗∗∗ (0.040) 
Additional job 0.040 (0.030) 0.040 (0.030) 0.040 (0.030) 0.040 (0.030) 
Firm size 1–10 (omitted) 
Firm size 11/19 − 0.103 ∗∗∗ (0.022) − 0.103 ∗∗∗ (0.022) − 0.103 ∗∗∗ (0.022) − 0.103 ∗∗∗ (0.022) 
Firm size 20/49 − 0.102 ∗∗∗ (0.022) − 0.102 ∗∗∗ (0.022) − 0.102 ∗∗∗ (0.022) − 0.102 ∗∗∗ (0.022) 
Firm size 50 + − 0.157 ∗∗∗ (0.019) − 0.157 ∗∗∗ (0.019) − 0.157 ∗∗∗ (0.019) − 0.157 ∗∗∗ (0.019) 
Temporary contract − 0.318 ∗∗∗ (0.030) − 0.318 ∗∗∗ (0.030) − 0.318 ∗∗∗ (0.030) − 0.318 ∗∗∗ (0.030) 
IMR1 − 0.114 ∗ (0.059) − 0.113 ∗ (0.059) − 0.109 ∗ (0.059) − 0.114 ∗ (0.059) 
IMR2 − 0.438 ∗∗∗ (0.155) − 0.441 ∗∗∗ (0.156) − 0.457 ∗∗∗ (0.154) − 0.427 ∗∗∗ (0.157) 
IMR3 0.768 ∗∗∗ (0.176) 0.769 ∗∗∗ (0.176) 0.801 ∗∗∗ (0.176) 0.765 ∗∗∗ (0.176) 
IMR4 − 0.270 ∗∗ (0.126) − 0.268 ∗∗ (0.127) − 0.241 ∗ (0.127) − 0.273 ∗∗ (0.126) 
Constant 6.491 ∗∗∗ (0.301) 5.165 ∗∗∗ (0.165) 5.166 ∗∗∗ (0.163) 5.164 ∗∗∗ (0.165) 
Adj. r square 0.0892 0.0892 0.0892 0.0892 
Observations 83,555 83,555 83,555 83,555 
Notes: Country-ﬁxed eﬀects omitted from the table and available upon request. Gender equality indicators normalized 
at mean (i.e., variables have the mean at zero, while preserving the original variation). Standard errors clustered at 
country/gender level (parametric correction for Moulton factor). Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗ p < 0.1. 
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Table A5 
Job satisfaction gender gap and gender equality in early stages of life (OLS, matched sample). 
2 3 4 5 
Female 0.069 ∗∗∗ (0.020) 0.070 ∗∗∗ (0.020) 0.052 ∗∗ (0.026) 0.110 ∗∗∗ (0.021) 
ELGE index − 0.029 (0.155) − 0.041 (0.156) − 0.036 (0.155) − 0.081 (0.155) 
Female ∗ ELGE index − 0.411 ∗∗∗ (0.082) − 0.385 ∗∗∗ (0.089) − 0.407 ∗∗∗ (0.083) − 0.342 ∗∗∗ (0.083) 
Female ∗ Age 0.001 (0.001) 
Female ∗ Ed 0.031 (0.028) 
Female ∗ Mocc − 0.248 ∗∗∗ (0.035) 
Ln wage 0.350 ∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.350 ∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.350 ∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.347 ∗∗∗ (0.014) 
Hours − 0.009 ∗∗∗ (0.001) − 0.009 ∗∗∗ (0.001) − 0.009 ∗∗∗ (0.001) − 0.009 ∗∗∗ (0.001) 
Hours50 − 0.064 ∗ (0.037) − 0.064 ∗ (0.037) − 0.063 ∗ (0.037) − 0.067 ∗ (0.037) 
Age − 0.009 ∗∗∗ (0.001) − 0.009 ∗∗∗ (0.001) − 0.009 ∗∗∗ (0.001) − 0.009 ∗∗∗ (0.001) 
Age 2 / 100 0.001 ∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.001 ∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.001 ∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.001 ∗∗∗ (0.000) 
Married 0.093 ∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.094 ∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.093 ∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.092 ∗∗∗ (0.017) 
Primary education (omitted) 
Secondary education − 0.288 ∗∗∗ (0.030) − 0.286 ∗∗∗ (0.030) − 0.287 ∗∗∗ (0.030) − 0.291 ∗∗∗ (0.030) 
Tertiary education − 0.414 ∗∗∗ (0.038) − 0.411 ∗∗∗ (0.038) − 0.430 ∗∗∗ (0.041) − 0.416 ∗∗∗ (0.038) 
Managers 0.824 ∗∗∗ (0.043) 0.825 ∗∗∗ (0.043) 0.824 ∗∗∗ (0.043) 0.940 ∗∗∗ (0.046) 
Professionals 0.712 ∗∗∗ (0.035) 0.712 ∗∗∗ (0.035) 0.710 ∗∗∗ (0.035) 0.720 ∗∗∗ (0.035) 
Technicians 0.605 ∗∗∗ (0.033) 0.606 ∗∗∗ (0.033) 0.604 ∗∗∗ (0.033) 0.614 ∗∗∗ (0.033) 
Clerks 0.491 ∗∗∗ (0.034) 0.492 ∗∗∗ (0.034) 0.490 ∗∗∗ (0.034) 0.493 ∗∗∗ (0.034) 
Service / sales workers 0.392 ∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.393 ∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.392 ∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.396 ∗∗∗ (0.031) 
Craft / trades workers 0.078 ∗∗ (0.037) 0.079 ∗∗ (0.037) 0.072 ∗ (0.037) 0.165 ∗∗∗ (0.039) 
Plant / mach. operators 0.169 ∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.170 ∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.165 ∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.276 ∗∗∗ (0.042) 
Elementary occupations (omitted) 
Sectors B-E (omitted) 
Sector F 0.097 ∗∗∗ (0.037) 0.097 ∗∗∗ (0.037) 0.094 ∗∗ (0.037) 0.061 (0.037) 
Sector G − 0.059 ∗∗ (0.028) − 0.059 ∗∗ (0.028) − 0.059 ∗∗ (0.028) − 0.072 ∗∗ (0.028) 
Sectors H - I 0.048 (0.030) 0.048 (0.030) 0.047 (0.031) 0.037 (0.031) 
Sectors J - K − 0.060 ∗ (0.031) − 0.060 ∗ (0.031) − 0.059 ∗ (0.031) − 0.067 ∗∗ (0.031) 
Sectors L - N − 0.028 (0.031) − 0.028 (0.031) − 0.029 (0.031) − 0.036 (0.031) 
Sector O 0.209 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.209 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.207 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.201 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 
Sector P 0.397 ∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.397 ∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.395 ∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.380 ∗∗∗ (0.029) 
Sector Q 0.279 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.278 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.277 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.259 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 
Sectors R - U 0.371 ∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.372 ∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.371 ∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.361 ∗∗∗ (0.040) 
Additional job 0.043 (0.030) 0.043 (0.030) 0.043 (0.030) 0.045 (0.030) 
Firm size 1–10 (omitted) 
Firm size 11/19 − 0.104 ∗∗∗ (0.022) − 0.104 ∗∗∗ (0.022) − 0.105 ∗∗∗ (0.022) − 0.103 ∗∗∗ (0.022) 
Firm size 20/49 − 0.102 ∗∗∗ (0.022) − 0.102 ∗∗∗ (0.022) − 0.102 ∗∗∗ (0.022) − 0.099 ∗∗∗ (0.022) 
Firm size 50 + − 0.157 ∗∗∗ (0.019) − 0.158 ∗∗∗ (0.019) − 0.157 ∗∗∗ (0.019) − 0.152 ∗∗∗ (0.019) 
Temporary contract − 0.316 ∗∗∗ (0.030) − 0.316 ∗∗∗ (0.030) − 0.316 ∗∗∗ (0.030) − 0.312 ∗∗∗ (0.030) 
IMR1 − 0.104 ∗ (0.055) − 0.105 ∗ (0.055) − 0.105 ∗ (0.055) − 0.106 ∗ (0.055) 
IMR2 − 0.367 ∗∗∗ (0.133) − 0.378 ∗∗∗ (0.134) − 0.356 ∗∗∗ (0.133) − 0.342 ∗∗∗ (0.133) 
IMR3 0.737 ∗∗∗ (0.156) 0.717 ∗∗∗ (0.158) 0.738 ∗∗∗ (0.156) 0.740 ∗∗∗ (0.156) 
IMR4 − 0.192 (0.122) − 0.203 ∗ (0.123) − 0.208 ∗ (0.123) − 0.223 ∗ (0.122) 
Constant 5.170 ∗∗∗ (0.131) 5.158 ∗∗∗ (0.132) 5.183 ∗∗∗ (0.132) 5.167 ∗∗∗ (0.131) 
r square 0.0895 0.0895 0.0895 0.0901 
Observations 83,555 83,555 83,555 83,555 
Notes: Country-ﬁxed eﬀects omitted from the table and available upon request. ELGE index and age normalized at 
mean (i.e., variables have the mean at zero, while preserving the original variation). Standard errors clustered at coun- 
try/gender/age level (parametric correction for Moulton factor). Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗ p < 0.1. 
Full estimates for column 1 from Table 3 already presented in table A4 . 
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Table A6 
Job satisfaction gender gap and gender equality in early stages of life (OLS, matched sample). 
1 2 3 4 
Female 0.069 ∗∗∗ (0.020) 0.070 ∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.071 ∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.070 ∗∗∗ (0.022) 
ELGE index − 0.029 (0.155) − 0.027 (0.167) − 0.031 (0.167) − 0.028 (0.168) 
Female ∗ ELGE index − 0.411 ∗∗∗ (0.082) − 0.412 ∗∗∗ (0.090) − 0.400 ∗∗∗ (0.092) − 0.413 ∗∗∗ (0.091) 
Female ∗ Overall GEI − 0.096 (0.331) 
Female ∗ EP Score − 0.163 (0.257) 
Female ∗ PE Score − 0.012 (0.110) 
Ln wage 0.350 ∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.350 ∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.350 ∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.350 ∗∗∗ (0.015) 
Hours − 0.009 ∗∗∗ (0.001) − 0.009 ∗∗∗ (0.001) − 0.009 ∗∗∗ (0.001) − 0.009 ∗∗∗ (0.001) 
Hours50 − 0.064 ∗ (0.037) − 0.064 ∗ (0.037) − 0.063 ∗ (0.037) − 0.064 ∗ (0.037) 
Age − 0.009 ∗∗∗ (0.001) − 0.009 ∗∗∗ (0.001) − 0.008 ∗∗∗ (0.001) − 0.009 ∗∗∗ (0.001) 
Age 2 / 100 0.001 ∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.001 ∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.001 ∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.001 ∗∗∗ (0.000) 
Married 0.093 ∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.093 ∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.092 ∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.093 ∗∗∗ (0.017) 
Primary education (omitted) 
Secondary education − 0.288 ∗∗∗ (0.030) − 0.288 ∗∗∗ (0.030) − 0.289 ∗∗∗ (0.030) − 0.288 ∗∗∗ (0.030) 
Tertiary education − 0.414 ∗∗∗ (0.038) − 0.415 ∗∗∗ (0.038) − 0.417 ∗∗∗ (0.039) − 0.414 ∗∗∗ (0.038) 
Managers 0.824 ∗∗∗ (0.043) 0.824 ∗∗∗ (0.044) 0.824 ∗∗∗ (0.044) 0.824 ∗∗∗ (0.044) 
Professionals 0.712 ∗∗∗ (0.035) 0.712 ∗∗∗ (0.035) 0.712 ∗∗∗ (0.035) 0.712 ∗∗∗ (0.035) 
Technicians 0.605 ∗∗∗ (0.033) 0.606 ∗∗∗ (0.033) 0.606 ∗∗∗ (0.033) 0.606 ∗∗∗ (0.033) 
Clerks 0.491 ∗∗∗ (0.034) 0.492 ∗∗∗ (0.034) 0.492 ∗∗∗ (0.034) 0.491 ∗∗∗ (0.034) 
Service / sales workers 0.392 ∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.393 ∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.393 ∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.392 ∗∗∗ (0.031) 
Craft / trades workers 0.078 ∗∗ (0.037) 0.078 ∗∗ (0.038) 0.078 ∗∗ (0.038) 0.078 ∗∗ (0.038) 
Plant / mach. operators 0.169 ∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.169 ∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.169 ∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.169 ∗∗∗ (0.039) 
Elementary occupations (omitted) 
Sectors B-E (omitted) 
Sector F 0.097 ∗∗∗ (0.037) 0.097 ∗∗∗ (0.037) 0.097 ∗∗∗ (0.037) 0.097 ∗∗∗ (0.037) 
Sector G − 0.059 ∗∗ (0.028) − 0.059 ∗∗ (0.028) − 0.059 ∗∗ (0.028) − 0.059 ∗∗ (0.028) 
Sectors H - I 0.048 (0.030) 0.049 (0.030) 0.048 (0.030) 0.049 (0.030) 
Sectors J - K − 0.060 ∗ (0.031) − 0.060 ∗ (0.031) − 0.060 ∗ (0.031) − 0.060 ∗ (0.031) 
Sectors L - N − 0.028 (0.031) − 0.028 (0.031) − 0.029 (0.031) − 0.028 (0.031) 
Sector O 0.209 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.209 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.209 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.209 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 
Sector P 0.397 ∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.397 ∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.397 ∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.397 ∗∗∗ (0.029) 
Sector Q 0.279 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.279 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.279 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.279 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 
Sectors R - U 0.371 ∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.371 ∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.371 ∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.371 ∗∗∗ (0.040) 
Additional job 0.043 (0.030) 0.043 (0.030) 0.043 (0.030) 0.043 (0.030) 
Firm size 1–10 (omitted) 
Firm size 11/19 − 0.104 ∗∗∗ (0.022) − 0.104 ∗∗∗ (0.022) − 0.104 ∗∗∗ (0.022) − 0.104 ∗∗∗ (0.022) 
Firm size 20/49 − 0.102 ∗∗∗ (0.022) − 0.102 ∗∗∗ (0.022) − 0.102 ∗∗∗ (0.022) − 0.102 ∗∗∗ (0.022) 
Firm size 50 + − 0.157 ∗∗∗ (0.019) − 0.157 ∗∗∗ (0.019) − 0.157 ∗∗∗ (0.019) − 0.157 ∗∗∗ (0.019) 
Temporary contract − 0.316 ∗∗∗ (0.030) − 0.316 ∗∗∗ (0.030) − 0.317 ∗∗∗ (0.030) − 0.316 ∗∗∗ (0.030) 
IMR1 − 0.104 ∗ (0.055) − 0.103 ∗ (0.057) − 0.102 ∗ (0.057) − 0.103 ∗ (0.057) 
IMR2 − 0.367 ∗∗∗ (0.133) − 0.372 ∗∗∗ (0.143) − 0.376 ∗∗∗ (0.143) − 0.369 ∗∗ (0.144) 
IMR3 0.737 ∗∗∗ (0.156) 0.740 ∗∗∗ (0.164) 0.752 ∗∗∗ (0.166) 0.738 ∗∗∗ (0.164) 
IMR4 − 0.192 (0.122) − 0.189 (0.124) − 0.182 (0.124) − 0.191 (0.124) 
Constant 5.170 ∗∗∗ (0.131) 5.171 ∗∗∗ (0.146) 5.170 ∗∗∗ (0.146) 5.170 ∗∗∗ (0.146) 
r square 0.0895 0.0895 0.0895 0.0895 
Observations 83,555 83,555 83,555 83,555 
Notes: Country-ﬁxed eﬀects omitted from the table and available upon request. Gender equality indicators, ELGE index 
and age normalized at mean (i.e., variables have the mean at zero, while preserving the original variation). Standard 
errors clustered at country/gender level (parametric correction for Moulton factor), accept for the column one where 
standard errors are clustered on the country/gender/age level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗ p < 0.1. 
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Table A7 
Heterogeneous eﬀects of ELGE across education groups and occupations (OLS, matched sample). 
1 2 3 
Female 0.069 ∗∗∗ (0.020) 0.076 ∗∗∗ (0.026) 0.110 ∗∗∗ (0.021) 
ELGE index − 0.029 (0.155) − 0.285 ∗ (0.166) − 0.078 (0.160) 
Female ∗ ELGE index − 0.411 ∗∗∗ (0.082) − 0.577 ∗∗∗ (0.109) − 0.340 ∗∗∗ (0.093) 
Female ∗ Tertiary Education 0.009 (0.028) 
ELGE ∗ Tertiary Education 0.576 ∗∗∗ (0.123) 
Female ∗ ELGE ∗ Tertiary Education 0.343 ∗∗ (0.159) 
Female ∗ Male-dominated occ. − 0.245 ∗∗∗ (0.036) 
ELGE ∗ Male-dominated occ. − 0.012 (0.134) 
Female ∗ ELGE ∗ Male-dominated occ. − 0.042 (0.211) 
Ln wage 0.350 ∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.352 ∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.348 ∗∗∗ (0.014) 
Hours − 0.009 ∗∗∗ (0.001) − 0.009 ∗∗∗ (0.001) − 0.009 ∗∗∗ (0.001) 
Hours50 − 0.064 ∗ (0.037) − 0.056 (0.037) − 0.067 ∗ (0.037) 
Age − 0.009 ∗∗∗ (0.001) − 0.008 ∗∗∗ (0.001) − 0.009 ∗∗∗ (0.001) 
Age 2 / 100 0.001 ∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.001 ∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.001 ∗∗∗ (0.000) 
Married 0.093 ∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.101 ∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.092 ∗∗∗ (0.017) 
Primary education (omitted) 
Secondary education − 0.288 ∗∗∗ (0.030) − 0.206 ∗∗∗ (0.031) − 0.290 ∗∗∗ (0.030) 
Tertiary education − 0.414 ∗∗∗ (0.038) − 0.324 ∗∗∗ (0.042) − 0.415 ∗∗∗ (0.038) 
Managers 0.824 ∗∗∗ (0.043) 0.797 ∗∗∗ (0.044) 0.939 ∗∗∗ (0.047) 
Professionals 0.712 ∗∗∗ (0.035) 0.685 ∗∗∗ (0.035) 0.720 ∗∗∗ (0.035) 
Technicians 0.605 ∗∗∗ (0.033) 0.580 ∗∗∗ (0.033) 0.613 ∗∗∗ (0.033) 
Clerks 0.491 ∗∗∗ (0.034) 0.467 ∗∗∗ (0.034) 0.493 ∗∗∗ (0.034) 
Service / sales workers 0.392 ∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.383 ∗∗∗ (0.031) 0.396 ∗∗∗ (0.031) 
Craft / trades workers 0.078 ∗∗ (0.037) 0.079 ∗∗ (0.037) 0.165 ∗∗∗ (0.039) 
Plant / mach. operators 0.169 ∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.172 ∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.277 ∗∗∗ (0.042) 
Elementary occupations (omitted) 
Sectors B-E (omitted) 
Sector F 0.097 ∗∗∗ (0.037) 0.094 ∗∗ (0.037) 0.061 (0.037) 
Sector G − 0.059 ∗∗ (0.028) − 0.060 ∗∗ (0.028) − 0.072 ∗∗ (0.028) 
Sectors H - I 0.048 (0.030) 0.044 (0.031) 0.036 (0.031) 
Sectors J - K − 0.060 ∗ (0.031) − 0.063 ∗∗ (0.031) − 0.068 ∗∗ (0.031) 
Sectors L - N − 0.028 (0.031) − 0.035 (0.031) − 0.036 (0.031) 
Sector O 0.209 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.202 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.201 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 
Sector P 0.397 ∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.401 ∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.380 ∗∗∗ (0.029) 
Sector Q 0.279 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.278 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.259 ∗∗∗ (0.028) 
Sectors R - U 0.371 ∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.364 ∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.361 ∗∗∗ (0.040) 
Additional job 0.043 (0.030) 0.042 (0.029) 0.045 (0.030) 
Firm size 1–10 (omitted) 
Firm size 11/19 − 0.104 ∗∗∗ (0.022) − 0.102 ∗∗∗ (0.022) − 0.103 ∗∗∗ (0.022) 
Firm size 20/49 − 0.102 ∗∗∗ (0.022) − 0.102 ∗∗∗ (0.022) − 0.099 ∗∗∗ (0.022) 
Firm size 50 + − 0.157 ∗∗∗ (0.019) − 0.156 ∗∗∗ (0.019) − 0.152 ∗∗∗ (0.019) 
Temporary contract − 0.316 ∗∗∗ (0.030) − 0.315 ∗∗∗ (0.030) − 0.312 ∗∗∗ (0.030) 
IMR1 − 0.104 ∗ (0.055) − 0.082 (0.055) − 0.106 ∗ (0.055) 
IMR2 − 0.367 ∗∗∗ (0.133) − 0.434 ∗∗∗ (0.134) − 0.343 ∗∗∗ (0.133) 
IMR3 0.737 ∗∗∗ (0.156) 0.525 ∗∗∗ (0.158) 0.739 ∗∗∗ (0.156) 
IMR4 − 0.192 (0.122) − 0.170 (0.123) − 0.223 ∗ (0.122) 
Constant (cut 1) 5.170 ∗∗∗ (0.131) 5.024 ∗∗∗ (0.134) 5.166 ∗∗∗ (0.132) 
(pseudo) r square 0.0895 0.0905 0.0900 
Observations 83,555 83,555 83,555 
Notes: Country-ﬁxed eﬀects omitted from the table and available upon request. ELGE index and age normalized 
at mean (i.e., variables have the mean at zero, while preserving the original variation). Standard errors clus- 
tered at country/gender/age level (parametric correction for Moulton factor). Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; 
∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗ p < 0.1. 
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